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1 Introduction 
 
There is a growing consensus that corporate governance has a positive relationship with national 
growth and development of economy. The financial crisis and the following collapses of major 
institutions have brought more attention to the need for effective and good governance methods both 
in developed and in developing markets. This study aims to compare the differences and similarities 
between African countries’ national corporate governance codes with European national codes. 
 
The major part of the study is a comparative analysis between the various African country codes and 
their historical colonising powers. The objective of this part of the study is to find out, how similar 
the codes are overall, and how much have the African countries mimicked their colonizers’ examples. 
Also, and more importantly perhaps, do African codes have some characteristics that are 
contradictory to their colonizers and specific to their own environment? The codes are also evaluated 
both against their colonizers’ codes but also with respect to how well the African countries’ codes 
have been adopted to fit the emerging market environment compared to the developed market 
environment of their former colonizers. We shall also address, whether the countries religious or legal 
origin as well as mortality rate of the settlers are somehow visible in the investor rights protection 
and governance today. 
 
A central theme for corporate governance research is to what extent good corporate governance 
practices can be universal, i.e. is there a one size fits all strategy for corporate governance, or are good 
practices instead country, culture or firm dependent. There is much evidence that there are no 
universal laws in corporate governance and that optimal governance differs, for example, between 
developed and developing markets (Bebchuk & Hamdani, 2009) and between emerging markets 
(Durnev & Fauver, 2007). Thus, also the corporate governance codes in different countries should be 
different and reflect the for example surrounding environment’s history, economic development and 
culture.  
 
This study will concentrate on African corporate governance for several reasons. The surge of 
corporate governance reform is evident also in Africa, as it can be seen in the amount of national 
corporate governance reports which have already been published. It is also the second largest 
continent in the world with a population over a billion, and in addition to this, many of the raw 
materials used in familiar western products come from Africa. Therefore, continent’s economic 
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development, which is majorly dependent also on the corporate governance development of each 
country and company, has an impact on a large scale not only in Africa itself but also in other parts 
of the world. Despite all of this, there still is a large shortage of research which studies African 
corporate governance. For example, McNulty, Zattoni and Douglas (2013) find that out of 78 
qualitative research papers on corporate governance that they investigated in their review of previous 
studies, only one’s setting is in Africa, while for example they found 37 studies focusing on United 
Kingdom alone. Thus, the importance of Africa as a research subject in corporate governance field 
has been somewhat neglected in research previously, while some other markets have been excessively 
studied. Therefore, much of the research on best practices in corporate governance are related to 
already developed markets and their specific problems. 
 
Africa is the poorest continent in the world by far. Much of the poverty is caused by Africa's history 
as a target of European colonial policy. The European colonial period of new imperialism lasted from 
circa 1870s to 1960s, and the European expansion’s target was primarily Africa. In 1914 at the peak 
of African colonisation, only Abyssinia (now Ethiopia) and Liberia remained independent from the 
imperialism of the Europeans. The major colonizers were the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, 
but also other European countries conquered areas for themselves during the 19th and 20th century. 
Therefore, as nearly all of the continent was under European power, European corporate governance 
can be seen as a major influence on African governance practices and development, and even 
overpowering their own cultural heritage (Marjomaa, 2011). Thus, we have selected also this path 
dependence based perspective to our study, as opposed to simply agency theory which has dominated 
much of the corporate governance research previously.  
 
Sophisticated and sound corporate governance practices can be helpful in obtaining new and much-
needed investments to Africa, as good quality corporate governance is especially important for 
investors. In 2003, Africa received only 3 % of the world’s foreign investments (Vaughn & Verstegen 
Ryan, 2006). Stulz (1999) finds that investors will reward those companies, which are well-governed, 
which will in turn lead to higher valuation. Surveys have shown that investors are willing to pay a 
price premium (over 20%) for companies with good governance, and this price premium is even 
higher in countries with weak legal protection (Chen, Chen & Wei, 2009). Also good governance 
lowers the cost of capital for firms by mitigating agency problems (Chen et al., 2009). In addition, 
good quality governance reduces the cost of monitoring for outside investors, which in turn can 
further lower the cost of capital for companies (Lombardo & Pagano, 2002). International norms and 
standards in governance can be used as a base for developing practices and regulations in problematic 
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markets and countries. This would then help investors to trust the corporate sector better and thus 
make these countries internationally more competitive in the capital markets. This way Africa could 
follow the path of BRIC-countries which are now becoming more important all the time in the global 
economy. Developing even the basic corporate governance practices, such as reporting, transparency, 
protection of minority rights, and independent auditing, can improve the economy on a long-term 
basis. 
 
Besides reaching investors and higher market valuation, corporate governance and governance codes 
have various other practical purposes as well. For example, they can be used as a reference point in 
other decision making, in managing risks by reducing the probability of misconducts, and the codes 
can help people from different backgrounds work more efficiently together (Paine, Deshpandé, 
Margolis & Bettcher 2005). This study addresses the issue whether the governance codes are in the 
path of developing into more sophisticated guidelines, in order to utilise the full potential of effective 
corporate governance. Therefore, we do not believe that the benefits of adopting better quality and 
suitable governance codes would be limited only to investor attraction, although much of the existing 
literature focuses on the effects of corporate governance on investors’ views and market valuation. 
 
For these reasons Africa is an important research subject, as we hope that with quality governance 
Africa could improve its reputation among investors, and through economic development improve 
the life of its population. Also for example former Unites States president Bill Clinton has recognised 
the investment potential of Nigeria, but declared that the government first needs to “put its house in 
order”, if they want to reach their full investment potential (Okike, 2007).  
 
Therefore, as has been presented above, improving the corporate governance codes in each country 
could therefore help to improve the performance of the companies and help them to obtain funds from 
new investors that would not have been willing to invest in them before. However, the actual 
implementation of corporate governance practices and mechanisms might become costly to 
companies in countries with traditionally weak legal rules and lower governance level (Doidge, 
Karolyi & Stulz, 2007), no matter what the corporate governance codes on paper might say. Having 
a corporate governance code in place in a country does not guarantee better or suitable governance. 
Therefore, we suggest that countries should not develop governance codes for purely exogenous 
reasons, but the need and content of a governance code should be more endogenously driven. 
 
This study contributes to field of corporate governance research and literature for the following 
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reasons. First of all, it contributes to the literature on African corporate governance which is still quite 
limited. There are not many studies describing multiple countries, but previous literature has mainly 
focused on the existing corporate governance practices in individual countries, or the effect of 
governance on performance. Also, much of the existing research has focused on a limited selection 
of countries, such as South Africa or Nigeria, leaving the majority of countries overlooked, even 
though there is a growing number of governance codes in place in Africa as well. Also comparisons 
on Africa and Europe have mainly focused on individual or specific issues, such as institutional 
development or legal origins. Governance guidelines have not been compared in previous research to 
each other in this way before. 
 
In addition to the research on African governance, this study contributes to the field of comparative 
research on corporate governance from the perspective of path dependency. Much of the previous 
comparative research has focused on for example comparing bank and market-based governance 
systems (see for example Bebchuk & Hamdani, 2009). This study approaches the comparative 
analysis from another perspective, as it tries to explain, if countries have designed their governance 
codes based on their relatively recent history. Thirdly, contribution will be made in the field of 
combining corporate governance codes and corruption. Although corporate governance and 
corruption have been researched in previous literature (see for example Dass et al. 2014), this research 
is done in a national governance code level against the national corruption level, instead of for 
example addressing whether good quality governance can improve firm value in corrupt 
environments. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. First we will describe the basic background and premise for Africa as 
a scene for corporate governance development, which entails both its colonial history and economic 
and financial development. The next section will discuss the most relevant theories for corporate 
governance research, as well as previous research on corporate governance mechanisms in different 
contexts, such as legal protection and market development, and in relation to corruption. After this, 
the paper describes the methodology and the data collection of the study. After these parts, we will 
describe the results of the study, and then we shall discuss and analyse important findings. 
Conclusions, possible limitations of the study, and further research opportunities will conclude the 
paper. 
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2 African economy 
 
2.1 Colonial history 
 
Europeans did not really conquer areas in Africa during the slave trades between the 17th century and 
18th century. The Portuguese had seized small areas near Angola and Mozambique, and some Dutch 
migrants settled in the southern tip of Africa during this time. In the north Muslims ruled over the 
areas around the Nile, the Red Sea and the Swahili coast. Therefore, much of the continent was still 
in the hands of Africans themselves, as outsiders did not have enough power or interest to make 
permanent conquests there. (Marjomaa, 2011, p. 82) 
 
The change to this became when the industrialisation increased in the Western Europe during the 19th 
century. As the British ruled much of the world trade at the time, the French decided to acquire 
colonies to break the British domination. This started the scramble for colonialism, as in the 1880s 
the British decided that they needed to respond to the growing competition by acquiring their own 
colonies, and many other European countries then followed. Africa was a major target for the 
colonialism, as their population’s ability to defend themselves against Europeans was weak. New type 
of weaponry, railways and effective medicines eased Europeans victory even against large numbers 
of opponents. There was also a lack of resistance, as many African leaders thought that by submission 
they would get to keep their autonomy against the colonizers, but the conquerors widely destroyed 
the traditional governments and administrative systems and replaced them with their own equivalents. 
(Marjomaa, 2011, p. 83) 
 
Picture 1 shows the colonial situation in 1914 in Africa, when only Liberia and Abyssinia (Now 
Ethiopia) were independent.  
 
Colonising powers often also affected the religion of different countries. Although the roots 
Christianity go back even to the 1st century, the major growth for Christianity for example came in 
the 20th century. Many Africans adopted Christianity through their European colonizers’ influence, 
and therefore much of the Sub-Saharan Africa is now Christian. The division of Catholic church and 
Protestants is not clearly cut, but for example in Central Africa Catholicism is more dominant than 
Protestants, while the Southern Africa is more Protestant. Nigeria is one of the examples of where 
large amounts of people have converted to Christianity. However, some of the countries chose Islam 
as a protest to the European imperialism. Islam is now the dominant religion in Northern Africa, as 
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the Arab conquest in late 7th century spread Islam into Africa and the many of the Muslim countries 
under French rule did not adopt new religions. (Marjomaa, 2011) 
 
Not all European 
countries used or 
accomplished using their 
colonial policy in the 
same way, and this has led 
to differences in the 
embedding of European 
institutions, culture, and 
market systems in Africa. 
Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson (2001) have 
described different 
premises for institutional 
differences between 
African countries which 
were subjects of European 
colonisation, which would 
explain many of reasons 
for differences. They 
argue that not only did the 
colonial origin affect the 
institutions, but they 
emphasise the importance of the conditions, such as disease environment, in the colonies, and how 
well colonizers could settle in the area. Where their settlement could not be carried out well, they 
created worse institutions. Therefore, Acemoglu et al. argue that when the settlers’ mortality rate was 
higher, colonizers would not try to build proper institutions in the colony but rather only to try to 
exploit the resources. In addition, some countries’, such as Belgium’s, initial strategy was the 
exploitation of the colony already from the start without even an attempt to build functioning 
institutions in the colony (Acemoglu et al.). This would have therefore resulted in even weaker 
institutions from the start. 
 
         Picture 1 African colonialism and colonizers in 1914. Source: Contrary Magazine Blog 
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Both the First and Second World Wars reduced the power of the European colonizers in Africa, and 
after the wars the attitudes towards imperialism grew more negative especially in United States and 
Soviet Union, and partly in Europe too. Independence movements arose soon after, and in the 1960s 
many African countries became independent fast after strikes, riots and independence wars. However, 
African countries have remained reliant on their former colonizers. Also the country borders have 
followed the borders of the colonies, and thus the nations do not represent any clear national or 
cultural characteristics, but many ethnic groups are divided between numerous nations. (Marjomaa, 
2009, p.89) 
 
2.2 Economy characteristics 
 
Many of the African countries have underdeveloped markets and financial institutions. However, 
there are some geographical differences in the development level, as some areas are more developed 
than others. For example, some countries, such as South Africa, Egypt and Nigeria are more 
developed and richer than the poorest countries, such as Congo, Liberia, and Eritrea (International 
Money Fund, 2014). Therefore, Africa as a whole cannot be characterised with one single market 
type. However, it cannot be denied that some of the poorest and most underdeveloped countries in 
the world are in Africa, and typically many of the countries have similar flaws and problems in their 
markets and community. 
 
According to financial ratios, such as the liquid liabilities to GDP, countries is the Sub-Saharan region 
have significantly less developed markets compared to other emerging markets: in Sub-Saharan 
Africa the ratio was 29.7 % and for example in South Asia 55.1 % in 2007 (Allen, Carletti, Cull, Qian 
& Senbet, 2010). Therefore, Africa seems to be much behind other emerging markets in this regard, 
although some progress has been seen. However, the persistent view still is that much of the 
continent’s markets have problems of corruption, and weak legal systems and regulation, and 
ineffective law enforcement (Munisi, Hermes & Randøy, 2014). Acemoglu et al. (2001) find that the 
reason for Africa’s poverty, when compared to other markets, is not so much cultural or geographical, 
but is a result of worse institutions. 
 
Other characteristics that are dominant in African economy are the predominance of closely-held 
family owned businesses, high level of government ownership, and the informal nature in many 
businesses (Okeahalam, 2004). All these alternatives in ownership structure bring their own issues 
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for governance. For example, family-ownership brings to question issues related to growth and 
transition to more diffused ownership, and in countries with high state-ownership questions related 
to privatisation and commercialisation arise in corporate governance (Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013).  
Many of the companies operate outside of the jurisdiction of stock exchanges, or even company laws, 
as a significant part of the enterprises are informal, with the exception of South Africa, where state-
ownership is less common and the stock markets are active (Rossouw, 2005). Therefore, all of these 
ownership related issues sets challenges to building governance codes that would reach wide range 
of businesses, as only stock exchange listing requirements would bind a small number of individual 
businesses and they would not be effective or practical in small and medium sized firms. Therefore, 
relying on stock exchange regulation and focusing on issues that are only targeted at large companies 
is not the answer to the corporate governance problems in Africa on a larger scale. 
 
In free market systems, governments let markets themselves set prices through market supply and 
demand allocate resources most efficiently. However, governments intervene with markets if they do 
not work efficiently in these aspects, but governments may also intervene to promote their own 
agendas. These agendas can be either beneficial, but often it is also possible that intervention is related 
to for example corruption. In many African countries the level of government intervention has 
traditionally been high, and much of the interfering has been directed at the financial systems, which 
has led to overall capital markets’ underdevelopment (Munisi et al., 2014). The development of 
markets have also been behind many other emerging markets, as many of the countries in Africa 
started to liberalise their markets only in 1990s, when many other markets started their liberalisation 
at least a decade earlier (Hermes & Lensink, 2013). 
 
One area that cannot be left unlooked in discussing African economy is corruption. Africa is widely 
considered as one of the most corrupt markets in the world, and of the ten most corrupt countries in 
the world five are from Africa according to Transparency International’s Perception Index from 2014. 
According to this index, Somalia is considered to be the most corrupt country in the world, with 
Sudan, Libya and Eritrea not far behind. Corruption in Africa ranges from high level public corruption 
to local corruption of bribery to ordinary bureaucratic procedures (Lawal, 2007). Another major 
problem when it comes to corporate governance for any developing market is the lack of efficient 
corporate governance mechanisms. For example, high quality external auditors, financial institutions 
and legal systems, and market for corporate control are either absent or undeveloped (Mishra, 2011).  
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3 Literary review of corporate governance 
 
3.1 Definitions 
 
Corporate governance can be defined in a number of ways. However, although having numerous 
descriptions and covering issues such as accountability for performance, corporate governance should 
not be confused with management or corporate responsibility, although in some areas they are related 
to each other. 
 
Nominally investors and shareholders own the corporations, but in reality they can have very little to 
do with the business. According to Shleifer and Vishny (1997), corporate governance deals with how 
investors and suppliers of finance try to assure themselves to get return on their investments to 
companies. Therefore, according to this description, the objective of corporate governance is to make 
sure that managers do not just run off with the money of investors. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer and Vishny (2000) also describe corporate governance as mechanisms which help investors 
to protect themselves against expropriation of insiders, i.e. managers and controlling shareholders. 
The narrow understanding of corporate governance would therefore mean the function and structure 
of the board of directors, representing investors, and its relation to the management of the company 
(Wymeersch, 2006). 
 
In an ideal market, market competition would force companies to minimise costs and as a part to that, 
adopt corporate governance rules that investors impose on them. Therefore, in the long run, we should 
not try to reform governance through political processes, as the market would reform corporate 
governance on its own. However, many researcher disagree with this point of view to let markets 
alone deal with governance issues. For example, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that solving 
governance problems requires other forces besides markets too, to which corporate governance would 
be the answer. 
 
Also the corporate governance codes compared in this study articulate some definition for corporate 
governance. One of the simplest and most often quoted definition is stated in the United Kingdom’s 
Cadbury Report: “Corporate governance is the system by which businesses are directed and 
controlled.” The narrow definition of corporate governance, the relationship between only board of 
directors and management, would not necessarily meet this criterion. A broader definition expands 
governance to mean all the internal relationships the company faces, including for example 
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relationships with financial markets and attending to issues raised by the conduct of shareholders. 
(Wymeersch, 2006) 
 
These definitions approach the question of governance from a theoretical perspective. From a 
practical perspective, corporate governance concerns, how managers can take stakeholders’ welfare 
into account in their actions of managing companies’ day-to-day activities. On the other hand board 
of directors is responsible for governing the firms in terms of hiring and firing executives, deciding 
on compensation policies and approving management’s actions. Effective corporate governance 
consists of transparency and disclosure of relevant information, protection of the rights of 
shareholders, and of independent directors who are able to make effective and successful decisions. 
 
As this study addresses the substance of different corporate governance codes, the broader definition 
of corporate governance with inclusion of other stakeholders besides shareholders is followed in this 
study. Thus, we can consider each country’s own definition of corporate governance and not limit 
areas of corporate governance codes from the start. However, we should take into account in our 
analysis the different understandings of corporate governance and its overlapping with for example 
corporate social responsibility. 
 
The term corruption is ambiguous amongst different institutions. For example, World Bank and IMF 
both define corruption vaguely meaning the misuse (or abuse) of public office for private ends (or 
gains) (IMF, 2005; World Bank, 1997), and there are even broader definitions, such as ”the abuse of 
entrusted power for private gain” (Transparency International, 2004). However, the Association of 
Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) has defined corruption in a more precise way as “a scheme that 
involves the employee’s use of his or her influence in business transactions in a way that violates his 
or her duty to the employer for the purpose of obtaining a benefit for him- or herself or someone else” 
(Kimbro, 2011). As we shall use the Transparency International index in our study as a reference 
point and data in our analysis, it is appropriate that we shall therefore use the broader definitions of 
corruption, as they have also done. 
 
3.2 Theories 
 
For example the survey study of Shleifer and Vishny's (1997) approach corporate governance from 
the agency theory perspective. Agency theory certainly has been the major theory and basis for 
 11 
 
empirical literature to understand corporate governance (Aguilera, Filatotchev, Gospel & Jackson 
2008). Therefore, much of the corporate governance literature and recommendations have focused on 
alleviating the possible principal-agent problems. Agency theory refers to the agency relationship 
between the principal, who delegates their work and power to the agent, who then performs the work 
on behalf of the principal (Eisenhardt, 1989). However, conflicts may arise when the desired goals of 
the principal and the agent are in conflict, and if the principal cannot check and make sure that the 
agent is working really in the interests of the principal. Agents can choose to hide information from 
the principals, expropriate funds or make decisions that only benefit themselves at the expense of the 
principal (Lubatkin, Lane, Collin & Very, 2007). Therefore, principals want to invest in monitoring 
and alignment of agents’ interests with their own with incentives, to protect themselves against the 
opportunistic behaviour of the management (Lubatkin et al, 2007). 
 
The prevalent management systems are many times guided by the assumption that self-interest is the 
most important and ultimate determinant for one’s behaviour, and therefore their interests are 
maximised when they earn as much as possible with minimal effort (Mangaliso, 2001). Also, agency 
theory considers efficiency and effectivity of governance mostly from the perspective of investors, 
and that the major objective of corporate governance is to assure investors that get return on their 
investment (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).  However, for example in the case of Africa, this is not always 
the case, as the African value system is based on the commitment to consensus and coexistence with 
the community (Rossouw, 2005), meaning that other groups besides shareholders can also be 
considered in the decision making. Therefore, the assumption of agents only trying to maximise their 
own self-interests at the sake of the principal is not as accurate in every context. Therefore, we cannot 
consider agency theory to be the only relevant theory that applies in corporate governance. 
 
The agency theory is concerned about the principal-agent conflicts which may arise when there is 
enough of diffused ownership, and owners do not then have enough control over management 
directly. However, in markets with concentrated ownership the traditional agency problems may not 
be as severe, but instead principal-principal conflicts may arise as different owners have different 
interests and different levels of control and power over the company. This approach has become 
known as the principal-principal model of corporate governance (Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton & 
Jiang, 2008). Therefore, as we are focusing on a market where concentrated ownership is common, 
we shall take into account this principal-principal perspective when describing the problems and 
recommendations of African corporate governance. 
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According to many studies by now, there is much evidence that there are no universal laws in 
corporate governance and in management accounting in general. The underlying theory is the 
contingency theory (Otley, 1980). It suggests that the appropriate accounting system, including 
corporate governance practices, will depend on the particular circumstances that the individual 
organisation faces. Contingency theory seeks to identify specific aspects related to specific 
circumstances, and then demonstrate an appropriate matching of the two. When for example Aguilera 
et al. (2008) have criticised agency theory for relying on a closed system approach to governance, 
their own approach suggests a more open system perspective. They suggest that the effectiveness of 
corporate governance practices is dependent on three factors: costs, contingencies and 
complementarities. All of these factors are related to the specific context of individual countries, 
which means that the underlying culture and especially country’s history affect, what kind of 
complementary combinations of governance practices would work best in each context for each 
individual organisation. Therefore, not only is the regional history and culture important, but also for 
example organisation’s industry, size and maturity matter in the selection of most appropriate 
governance mechanisms. 
 
Path dependence can explain much of the differences of corporate governance mechanisms in 
different contexts. This means that reasons for different kinds of governance mechanisms arise from 
each country’s or market’s own and specific conditions from where they started to build their 
governance basis (Bebchuk & Roe, 1999). Both country’s ownership structure and corporate rules 
can affect each county’s own governance systems and their development. The efficient ownership 
structure in a country can depend on earlier structures, and previous structures can persist because of 
authorities who enjoy their benefits have the possibility to impede changes. National corporate rules, 
for example rules that make acquiring large holdings costly or difficult for investors, can also affect 
ownership structures, which in turn will then affect suitable governance mechanisms. For example, 
anti-takeover rules can encourage diffused ownership, or countries which already have diffused 
ownership can have many interest groups which would lobby for such rules to be introduced. These 
rules persist, even though different policies would be introduced in different markets. For example, 
local institutions and structures have already adapted their mechanisms to respond to problems that 
may arise under these rules, and therefore their mechanisms and rules are complementarities to each 
other. Therefore, new and different mechanisms can be unnecessary for them, if the ownership 
structure does not change for other reasons first. (Bebchuk & Roe, 1999) 
 
Although it could be assumed that countries would not want to impose undesirable laws onto their 
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companies and that it would be already known which rules are favourable, corporate rules still are 
very different even between highly developed markets, such as United States and Germany. Although 
the overall tone and principles of two systems might be the same, many times the details and 
implementation differ greatly, making therefore the optimal governance policies differ too (Bebchuk 
& Roe, 1999). Therefore, no clear definition of good or bad corporate rules from governance 
perspective can be given.  
 
Bebchuk and Roe (1999) also argue that when countries are on significantly different levels on 
economic development, there most probably are other reasons than path dependence for different 
mechanisms. However, in the case of Africa and Europe, although clearly the two markets have had 
a significant gap between their development levels, path dependence can still be a major explanatory 
perspective for African corporate governance development, as the continents’ histories are so greatly 
confined.  
 
At first it could be assumed that developed markets would have developed the most effective 
governance mechanisms, which should be adopted everywhere else too. However, corporate 
governance is not as simple as technological innovations for example in this regard. Therefore, 
according to these theories and approaches presented above, good and effective governance is more 
context-specific than only the basic agency theory would suggest. The most beneficial governance 
mechanism can therefore vary between different markets and even between different companies 
inside a single market according to company size, life cycle or complexity. 
 
3.3 Corporate governance codes 
 
 
The rules for corporate governance in different countries can be scattered in many different sources. 
Basic governance rules can be listed in statutory instruments, such as company laws, while more 
complex topics, such as takeover bids, can be referred in legislation or be promoted in listing 
requirements for stock exchanges. Companies can also have internal rules, for example, for board of 
directors that contain governance provisions, and informal traditions can also have an impact on 
governance. Corporate governance “codes” have been developed to coordinate these decentralised 
recommendations into consolidated governance codes. (Wymeersch, 2006). Thus, in markets, where 
the institutional setting might be failing to provide good-quality investor protection and rights, 
governance codes can be seen as a response to remedy these problems (Munisi et al., 2014). By 
complying with these codes, companies in such countries can signal investors that their governance 
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quality is higher than the average country level would suggest otherwise. Here we shall describe the 
basic premise for corporate governance code development.  
 
The breakthrough of European corporate governance was the Cadbury Report in 1992, as it was 
developed as a response to the various outrageous business scandals in the 1980s, including 
apparently undeserved increments in executive salaries and auditors’ failure to perceive large 
bankruptcies, in the United Kingdom (Boyd, 1996). Because of these scandals, the City of London 
appointed a special committee, called the Cadbury Committee after its chairman Sir Adrian Cadbury, 
to examine the financial aspects of corporate governance and raise its standards, by illustrating the 
responsibilities of each party involved in governance (Fernando, 2009). The report gave guidelines 
for board of directors, non-executive directors, reporting, and control. The Cadbury Report became 
the world leader in corporate governance codes, although in the United States similar codes, such as 
the Treadway Commission Report, had been developed earlier in 1987 (Vinten, 2001), and many of 
the recommendations of the Cadbury Report (for example the definition of corporate governance), 
have been incorporated into the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance in 1999 and into other 
national codes (Jones & Pollitt, 2004). Nowadays the OECD governance codes are considered to be 
the reference point for many countries developing their own national corporate governance codes. 
 
Governance policy systems can be divided into either hard law or soft law approaches (see for 
example Aguilera et al., 2008). Hard law systems refer to regulation, such as Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
which regulates bindingly all of the companies that operate under its jurisdiction and defines the 
minimum standards for governance. However, the soft law approach is usually based on the comply-
or-explain model.  
 
The Cadbury Report introduced the comply-or-explain model, which has since then formed the 
standard for many other corporate governance codes. The recommendations of the Cadbury Report 
were not mandatory in nature, but the companies listed in London Stock Exchange had to explain 
their reasons for non-compliance if they did not follow the code (Fernando, 2009). This flexibility 
encourages companies to adopt at least the spirit of the code that mandatory systems, such as the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and other hard law systems do not (Arcot, Bruno & Faure-Grimaud, 2010). 
According to Arcot et al. the comply-or-explain model should lead to better governance because of 
this, as following a mandatory system to the letter fails to take into account the differences of 
companies and their special characteristics. Therefore, it should be in line with the contingency theory 
approach that one size does not fit all in corporate governance (see for example Black, Gledson de 
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Carvalho & Gorga, 2012), as has been discussed earlier. Codes that have originated more as private 
initiatives, such as from academics (like the first German code Frankfurt Initiative), serve more as 
moral value guidance and can be better described as “voluntary” than with the comply-or-explain 
model (Wymeersch, 2006). 
 
However, although the comply-or-explain model should in theory ultimately lead to better governance 
by giving companies more discretion and flexibility over their own governance to make suit their 
environment, it seems to work better in fostering command compliance rather than in explaining non-
compliance (Arcot et al., 2010). Arcot et al. suggest that the major problem with the approach is that 
the explanations for non-compliance are not sufficient, and companies frequently use standard 
explanations rather than profound and true reasons for not complying with the codes. Also MacNeil 
and Li (2006) point out that investors are tolerating the non-compliance and vague explanations from 
the company, if the financial performance of the firm is sufficient. Therefore, it could be assumed that 
shareholder pressure is mainly targeted on compliance only, rather than explaining reasons for 
different practices. This could mean that shareholders do not truly understand and value the benefits 
of tailored and firm specific governance practices as much as they should. This is rather prejudiced, 
as high quality explanations for not complying with the corporate governance code are connected to 
higher corporate performance (Arcot & Bruno, 2006). 
 
In addition to this, MacNeil and Li (2006) have criticised the comply-or-explain model for offering 
the shareholders a weaker role than the board of directors in governing the company, as they only get 
to review compliance ex post as opposed to the board. This appears ironic as the target of the codes 
is to reduce principal-agent problems. They argue that the comply-or-explain model does not really 
offer any better results than what could be achieved with default rules in company laws. Thus, 
although comply-or-explain model seems to be the prevalent and most distinguished approach on 
which to base corporate governance codes, it is not without its problems. 
 
3.4 Different markets 
 
Countries differ in many ways, for example in legal traditions and rules, culture, language, location 
and religion. This chapter will describe the findings of effective governance practices in different 
contexts, but mostly we shall focus on research concerning developing markets and institutions or 
markets with concentrated ownership, as they are relevant approaches for examining African 
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corporate governance. We shall take a look at corporate governance and its important determinants 
from to different perspectives: First through the context of market characteristics in general, and then 
specifically though the investor protection perspective. 
 
3.4.1 Market and institutional based systems 
 
The most common way to classify different corporate governance systems is to divide them between 
the market-based system (Anglo-Saxon) and the institutionally-based system (German) (Prowse, 
1994). However, many of the governance systems around the world do not fit into either one of these 
perfectly, as there are many hybrid systems, and some of them have their own specific details.  
Therefore for example Weimer and Pape (1999) have classified four different governance systems 
around the world, which are Anglo-Saxon, Germanic, and Latin countries, and Japan. 
 
The market based system, or the Anglo-Saxon model, is characterised by widely dispersed ownership, 
one-tier boards, less close relationships between shareholders and managers, and greater demand for 
market for corporate control (Rwegasira, 2000). In these markets, the principal-agent conflicts may 
arise and therefore much of the mechanisms are directed at aligning the interests of managers and 
shareholders. On the other hand institutionally-based Germanic system suggests a close relation 
between large shareholders and managers as well as between managers and employees, recommends 
a two-tier board system which clearly separates management of the company and supervision, and is 
characterised by banks having high stakeholder influence (Weimer & Pape, 1999). Today most of 
German companies for example may be nominally owned by many shareholders but in reality are 
controlled by large banks via proxies (Morck & Steier, 2005). Generally there is a weak market for 
corporate control, as large shareholders can control and monitor management through boards and 
other mechanisms by themselves. Also the two-tier board system, which is a major characteristic of 
German corporate governance, was developed and written into German Company Law already in 
1870 (Morck & Steier). Performance based compensation policies have traditionally been more 
limited in Germanic countries than in Anglo-Saxon countries (Weimer & Pape, 1999), although there 
has been a rise in the performance based compensations also in Germanic countries. 
 
The Latin group is between the two systems previously described, but somewhat closer to Germanic 
system. The majority of the countries in this system have one-tier boards like in the Anglo-Saxon 
system and shareholder power is greater than in Germanic countries in general. However, with the 
company president (especially in France), families and governments, and gross-holdings having 
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much power, the one vote-one share –principle does not usually apply, like in the Anglo-Saxon model. 
Also the market for corporate control is limited (Weimer & Pape, 1999). It has been argued that 
France for example fell behind the United Kingdom in corporate governance development due to the 
dominance of family ownerships and legislation that made for example the bequest of businesses to 
other than own children almost impossible, which in turn made the governance more conservative 
(Morck & Steier, 2005). 
 
In paper, the first three groups are relevant when explaining how African corporate governance codes 
would have been developed. Great Britain belongs in the Anglo-Saxon group, and it had numerous 
colonies in Africa, Germany belongs in Germanic group and also had many colonies, and in the Latin 
group belong France, Belgium, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, with France having the majority of the 
colonies in this group. Therefore, in theory, the Anglo-Saxon governance should dominate much of 
the corporate governance codes, and the French system should prevail too. After the First World War 
German colonies were divided to Great Britain, Belgium and France, so therefore the influence of 
Germany could be visible in the codes of countries that now would be categorised as British or French 
colonies. 
 
It has been found that optimal governance differs between emerging and developed markets (Bebchuk 
& Hamdani, 2009), and even between emerging markets (Durnev & Fauver, 2007). Based on the 
corporate governance bundle idea, the context of the country and the specific context of an individual 
company determines what corporate governance mechanisms should be most suitable for that given 
environment and that company. Thus, no one universal law can be used to determine the best 
governance code. However, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) have argued that good corporate governance 
system needs some form of concentrated ownership, as large owners can force managers to distribute 
profits to shareholders and not only to their own empire building or other agendas. Also a functional 
governance systems requires legal protection of investors, so that shareholders have power over 
management. All the successful corporate governance systems, Anglo-Saxon, Germanic and Japanese 
have some combination of ownership and legal protection of investors: if the ownership concentration 
is lower, then there is a need for higher legal protection of investors, and vice versa. 
 
As it is not possible to address a single corporate governance methodology that would apply to all 
companies in all countries, Bebchuk and Hamdani (2009) suggest that there should be two different 
models of governance based on whether or not companies have a controlling shareholder or not, and 
therefore the development level of a country itself does not define what kind of corporate governance 
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mechanisms should be applied. Companies that do not have controlling shareholders should put 
significant emphasis on developing mechanisms that govern hostile takeovers and proxy-fights and 
give shareholders the possibility to influence through confidential voting (proxy voting, vote by mail). 
In companies that have controlling shareholders, the emphasis should be on developing mechanism 
such as minority’s right to block certain transactions and activities or cumulative voting, and to take 
into account the degree to which cash flow and voting rights are separated. This perspective is further 
described in the upcoming section in relation to legal protection of investors. (Bebchuk & Hamdani, 
2009) 
 
3.4.2 Country characteristics 
 
Many of the previous studies of corporate governance have focused either on already developed 
economies' and markets' governance issues, or on corporate governance in emerging markets, 
focusing mainly on BRIC/BRIK countries (e.g. Black et al., 2012). Literature on corporate 
governance in less developed markets has mostly emerged in the last decade. In the survey of Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997), they stated that the corporate governance mechanisms in less developed countries 
are almost non-existent. However, now after nearly two decades since the Shleifer and Vishny’s paper, 
there is a growing number of studies examining corporate governance mechanisms in multiple 
countries, also in developing countries as well as in developed markets, which suggest that there has 
been improvements in the field of governance as well.  
 
As this study will describe corporate governance on a country level, we should address why countries 
matter so much for corporate governance. According to Doidge et al. (2007), countries significantly 
influence the costs firms encounter if they want to bond themselves to good governance. The country 
characteristics mentioned refer to such characteristics as the financial and economic development of 
the country, and the openness of country’s markets to global financial markets. It is not surprising that 
companies score higher in corporate governance indexes in countries, which are more developed 
financially and economically. Also higher governance is related to countries with lower corruption, 
better property rights, competitive markets, better bureaucracy, and autocratic state authorities 
(Durnev & Fauver, 2007). These attributes are generally connected to advanced economies too. 
 
As mentioned, one of the major benefits of good-quality corporate governance is that firms can access 
capital markets on better terms. However, in countries with less developed financial markets, 
companies gain less benefits from investments in better governance as the companies cannot obtain 
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as much capital from undeveloped financial markets (Doidge et al., 2007). Firm and industry 
characteristics are not as important determinant for differences in governance and transparency in 
such markets. As building a credible financial market system takes a long time to develop, many times 
bank-centred governance systems (such as German governance system) are considered to be more 
suitable for developing countries (Rwegasira, 2000). Equity finance is less common in developing 
markets, while particularly shot-term debt is the main source of funding. This serves not only as a 
source of finance, but also as a monitoring mechanism for the creditors over the companies (Durnev 
& Fauver, 2007). Therefore, institutionally-based governance systems could cover more than one 
aspect of governance and benefit both companies and investors simultaneously with different 
mechanisms. 
 
If accessing global markets is difficult or impossible for some reason, ownership concentration should 
theoretically be an efficient governance mechanism (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). If the institutions, also 
including banks, in a country are underdeveloped, centrally controlled owner groups can substitute 
for the lack of institutions (Khanna & Yafeh, 2007). Also employee ownership has been found to be 
related to better performance (Boubakri, Cosset & Guadhami, 2005), so also employee inclusion 
could also be a possible governance mechanism in developing markets. However, although 
concentrated ownership exists in Africa, the problems of governance still persist due to crony 
capitalism, as close relationships to governments and businesses are vital to business success, and 
large block holders can exploit their power through rent extraction the same way as managers might 
(Ayogu, 2001). 
 
Therefore building an institutionally based governance system in developing markets is not 
straightforward either, as it is based on functioning formal institutions such as banks and creditor 
rights’ enforcement. Lack of formal institutions such as enforcement of laws, regulations and 
governance codes means that informal institutions such as personal relationships, government 
contracts and family ties to become important elements in the development of corporate governance 
systems (Young et al., 2008). The institutional development and context of a country therefore affects 
development of suitable and effective corporate governance bundle at the firm level. Thus, individual 
countries need to develop their own path in developing a suitable governance code and mechanisms 
that suit their institutions and support the institutional development further. 
 
According to Doidge et al. (2007), a ”better governance reduces a firm's cost of funds only to the 
extent that investors expect the firm to be well-governed after the funds have been raised”. Thus, 
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governance needs to truly convince investors, and credible corporate governance in developing 
countries can be costly. Higher costs for better quality governance can for example occur when a 
company wants to hire an external auditor of high reputation. Not only does said auditor charge more 
than previous auditors, it will also take time for management to find and hire the auditor. Also the 
mechanisms for obtaining credible governance could even be unavailable due to lack of appropriate 
infrastructure. Therefore, in countries with weak investor protection and poor economic development, 
the costs of committing themselves to high-quality governance might become excessive for firms in 
practice (Doidge et al.), even if in paper governance codes would recommend sophisticated 
governance mechanisms. Therefore, the underlying problem for improving governance is not so much 
the availability of suitable recommendations for each country, but the issue is many times relates to 
the practical implementation of the recommendations. 
 
Firms own decision on governance and firm-level actions become more important in less developed 
countries with lower expectations on governance, as there is a lack of efficient peer pressure for better 
corporate governance. For example, Doidge et al. (2007) find evidence that firm characteristics, such 
as size or industry of the company, can explain the differences in governance also in less developed 
countries, if companies still have access to international markets. Therefore, if firms have 
characteristics that attract investors, investors are more willing to see beyond the weak country 
characteristics. Klapper and Love (2004) have also found that firms that are traded in the United 
States have higher governance rankings and especially so if the countries of the firms have weak legal 
systems. Firm-level governance can therefore substitute for country’s legal protection, and of course 
vice versa (Chen et al., 2009), but companies must be able to get financing from developed financial 
markets to be able to benefit more from investments in governance. 
 
As in developing economies the external governance mechanism are many times underdeveloped 
(Mishra, 2011), the problems need to be addressed using mainly internal governance mechanisms, 
such as through effective board of directors (Jensen, 1993). However, optimal internal governance 
practices and their effects can differ even between these markets, although the reasons for this are not 
always clear. For example, in Korea board independence has been found to be related to higher market 
value for firms (Black, Jang & Kim, 2006), whereas in Brazil it has been found to have a significant 
negative affect on firm’s market value (Black et al., 2012). There is not clear evidence for why 
independent board would affect market value negatively, but as usually guidelines and rules instruct 
to elect only one or two members to be independent, it is possible that only a few independent 
directors do not have the power to influence board decisions significantly (Black et al.). Also Ararat, 
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Orbay and Yurtoglu (2011) (see Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013) find that for example in Turkey, where 
the governance codes recommend arbitrary low levels of independent board members, boards are 
ineffective and harmful for minority shareholders. Therefore, it could be that there is a certain 
threshold for independent board members for them to be truly effective for firm. Thus, we would 
suggest that African countries should take this into consideration and should recommend sufficient 
amount of independent and non-executive board members for them to be truly effective and 
beneficial. 
 
3.4.3 Legal protection of investors 
 
Many times corporate governance research has been done from the financing perspective, comparing 
bank financed systems, such as German system, to market-based systems, such as that of United 
States (see for example Allen & Gale, 2000). However, this point of view does not work as well when 
trying to compare systems that are a combination of the two, as many countries at the moment are. 
This notion has generated different perspectives for looking into governance systems, and one of the 
most famous perspectives is the legal protection of investors in different markets. This means the 
protection of rights of both creditors and shareholders from expropriation conducted by both 
management and large shareholders. Expropriation can happen in a variety of ways: selling and 
buying assets to their own companies above or below market prices, overpaying management, 
targeted dividends, or even simply stealing the profits of the company. The legal protection refers 
both to the laws that are in place and to their enforcement in the country. (La Porta et al., 2000) 
 
The extent of legal protection of investors varies greatly around the world, as in for example United 
States, Japan and in Western Europe the law protects the rights of investors relatively well, and courts 
are willing and able to enforce these laws. However, in most of the less developed markets, the legal 
system is too weak to offer true legal protection of investors (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). This then 
affects also the governance level of companies in such countries, as for example Klapper and Love’s 
(2004) find that the quality of governance is lower in countries with weak legal protection. However, 
good corporate governance through for example soft law codes could improve the protection of 
investors’ rights even if the legal environment in general would not provide much protection. Klapper 
and Love have also found that firm-level corporate governance is especially important in countries 
with weak legal protection for investors, as good governance is positively associated with operating 
performance and market value. This correlation is even stronger in countries with weak legal systems. 
It is also possible that the legal system and its level matters less for firms that are already well-
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governed, and therefore they do not need to rely on the legal system as much (Klapper & Love). 
However, as has been described earlier, good corporate governance improves investors’ opinion of 
the company and helps companies to obtain financing for their investments. Investors are willing to 
pay a price premium (even over 20%) for companies with good governance, and this price premium 
is even higher in countries with weak legal protection (Chen et al., 2009). Hence, we suggest that 
companies which are in weak legal environment should strive for good quality governance even if 
the overall environment would not be encouraging. 
 
Also the recent financial crisis and possible future scandals might have a stronger impact in developed 
countries such as United States, where the governance level should be of higher level in general rather 
than for example in African countries. Investors already consider emerging markets’ legal 
environment and governance policies so weak that major scandals, which might affect the trust of 
investors in more developed markets with already sophisticated guidelines and rules, probably do not 
affect investors cost of capital requirements as much in emerging markets. (Chen et al., 2009) 
 
Mechanisms for protection 
 
As Bebchuk and Hamdani (2009) suggest, the classification between controlling shareholders and 
diffused ownership can be used to develop governance methodologies for different companies. Here 
we shall discuss the possible violations of investor protection in both cases but mainly focusing on 
the concentrated ownership companies, as they are more relevant in the case of Africa. Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) state that shareholder voting rights are violated more boldly in countries with low legal 
protection than elsewhere. For instance, management can neglect to inform shareholders about annual 
meetings, and prevent shareholders with dissenting views from voting based on technicalities. These 
kinds of violations relate to investor’s rights against the management of the company. In these 
instances corporate governance mechanisms should focus on assuring shareholders’ voting rights, 
such as proxy and mail voting, as well as governing hostile takeover mechanisms (Bebchuk & 
Hamdani). These principal-agency problems have been widely present in the research of developed 
markets (Young et al., 2008), as the agency-theory has dominated the research field and diffused 
ownership is common especially in United States and United Kingdom, which have also been the 
subjects for many researches in past. 
 
In addition to the problems described above, the protection of investors’ rights many times refers also 
to the minority shareholders’ rights against the large shareholder. These principal-principal problems 
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are as especially problematic for emerging and developing economies, where concentrated ownership 
is many times used as a substitute for market based governance and control systems (Young et al., 
2008). The problem is that once large shareholders have “nearly full control of the company, they 
prefer to generate private benefits of control that are not shared by minority shareholders” (Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1997). In these situations, governance codes should address especially the ways in which 
minority shareholders can protect themselves against the expropriation of large shareholders. For 
example, superior voting rights and significant departures from the one-share-one-vote practice can 
enable large owners to abuse their power over other shareholders (Shleifer & Vishny). Through this 
kind of means, owners can for example use their power to pay themselves extra dividends or issue 
targeted share repurchases to benefit themselves. Also controlling shareholder can only elect those 
directors that run their own causes rather than those of all shareholders. As in Africa ownership 
concentration is common, the appropriation of large owners could be a significant problem, and 
therefore they should focus their corporate governance recommendations to address this issue.  
 
Ways of addressing the minority shareholder rights are for example recommending the one-share-
one-vote practice, common shares without voting rights and ownership ceilings (Caprasse, Clerc, & 
Becht, 2007). Linking cash-flow and voting rights together can therefore at least guarantee minority 
shareholders the dividend pay-outs, and a possibility to vote on issues that concern their interests, 
even if the decisions made by controlling shareholders would not otherwise please them. However, 
these mechanisms may also have problems. Nothing guarantees that the one-share-one-vote practice 
for example would prevent large shareholders from ignoring the wishes and interests of minority 
shareholders, and therefore it does not guarantee that minorities would have their voices 
acknowledged in decision making (Rosser, s.a.). However, although the one-share-one vote practice 
has its flaws, it is still in literature the dominant view of how voting and cash flow rights should be 
arranged (Adams & Ferreira, 2007). Ownership ceilings on the other hand can result in large 
shareholder aversions (Caprasse et al.). If large powerful investors would be absent, the owners 
monitoring power over management would be reduced significantly in those markets, where the 
market for corporate control is limited. Voting right restrictions and ownership ceilings can therefore 
at the same time reduce principal-principal problems to some extent, but at the same time increase 
principal-agent problems. It could be expected that many African companies in countries with 
undeveloped external financial markets, with weak or non-existent external market control 
mechanisms, could not cope if ownership ceilings would be forced to them as then the main control 
mechanism over management, large and powerful investors, would be weakened. Therefore, efforts 
to improve the institutions of the country should come first before such recommendations for diffused 
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ownership. However, one-share-one-vote principle or other voting right practices could be used as a 
governance mechanism in these markets as well. Also for example the OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance (2004) propose that in countries, where the enforcement of the legal framework is weak, 
strengthening the ex-ante rights of shareholders, such as encouraging low thresholds for placing items 
and resolutions on the general meeting’s agenda, should be desirable. Mechanisms that allow 
minorities to block certain company transactions or cumulative voting, which can enable minorities 
to elect a director even against controlling shareholder’s wishes, are other possible governance 
mechanisms to empower minorities (Bebchuk & Hamdani, 2009).  
 
Although large shareholders can reduce the costs of monitoring the management, the total costs of 
monitoring might be higher in emerging economies with wide concentrated ownership (Young et al., 
2008). Ambiguous ownership structures, such as pyramid structures or complicated cross-holdings, 
can increase the costs of monitoring and the costs of assuring creditors and minority shareholders of 
their protection. Large shareholders and high family ownership have been found to be especially 
damaging in pyramidal groups, but they can be more beneficial in freestanding companies (Adams & 
Ferreira, 2007). Therefore, concentrated ownership as such is not a bad basis for developing 
governance mechanism, but it can be more damaging to minorities in some forms. Therefore, high 
quality disclosure on these complex structures should be encouraged, at least to try to minimise the 
possible problems and reduce the higher monitoring costs. In conclusion we can say that concentrated 
ownership can cause problems for company’s competitiveness and credibility in the eyes of investors, 
and some practices associated with concentrated ownership can also lower firm value. Especially 
separation of voting rights and cash flow rights, such as dual-class shares, cross holdings and 
pyramiding, have been found to be associated with lower market value (Claessens, Djankov, Fan, & 
Lang, 1999). Claessens et al. study was conducted in the developing markets of East Asia and 
therefore these results can be extended to apply also the developing markets in Africa, which struggle 
with similar issues. Companies may try to alleviate these problems by following the recommendations 
of governance codes which acknowledge and emphasise minority rights, for example in 
recommending linking cash flow and voting rights and hindering pyramiding. 
 
As these horizontal problems between owners can be especially important for emerging markets, this 
also means that traditional principal-agent conflicts are less of a problem at least in relation to 
principal-principal conflicts. Therefore, governance mechanisms that are designed to alleviate 
principal-agent problems, although important, might be less urgent and needed in African governance 
codes. Governance mechanisms, such as anti-takeover mechanisms are therefore many times 
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irrelevant for developing countries where concentrated ownership is the norm (Bebchuk & Hamdani, 
2009). The violations against creditors are also possible in emerging markets, as the underdeveloped 
institutions cannot always guarantee creditors’ rights to be acknowledged properly. Other sorts of 
violations can relate also to the ease and ability of creditors to realise collaterals in corporate defaults 
and protection against management or large shareholder expropriation (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1998). 
 
Escaping weak legal environment 
 
La Porta et al. (1998) argue that the extent of investor rights’ protection and the extent to which those 
laws are enforced, are the major determinants for corporate governance evolvement and development 
in a specific country. If the investor protection is therefore so important determinant for governance, 
what can companies do in countries with weak legal protection? First of all as the markets become 
more open, the importance of country characteristics, such as investor protection and legal 
enforcement, are reduced by financial globalisation (Doidge et al., 2007). Doidge et al. argue that if 
firms can access foreign capital markets, then they are less dependent upon national economic 
development and can shield themselves partly from weak national protection. Companies can avoid 
some of the disadvantages of their own country’s governance if list their shares in foreign stock 
exchanges, and investors can file claims better on international courts if for example investor rights 
have been violated. Famous foreign stock exchanges have higher requirements for firm’s governance, 
such as transparency and disclosure standards, than many national codes would require (especially in 
emerging markets) and thus companies can borrow the governance of more developed markets by 
listing in them. 
 
Although legal environment is one of the most important determinants of governance overall, Klapper 
and Love (2004) argue that the variance in the level of governance between companies is still not 
systematically related to countries legal environments. Thus, there can be well governed firms in 
countries with weak legal protection and vice versa. However, the average quality of corporate 
governance is higher in countries with strong legal protection. Therefore, according to Klapper and 
Love, improving national legal rules should lead to higher average level of firm-level governance. 
However, although many of the findings above state that the legal environment, particularly investor 
protection is an important, or even the most important, determinant for firm’s governance, Doidge et 
al. (2007) remind that economic and financial development and the openness of county’s markets are 
important determinants too. 
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Origin of legal protection 
 
Why does investor protection then differ between countries? La Porta et al. (1998) state that the legal 
origin of a country explains partly the degree of investor protection, and common law countries have 
better investor right protection than civil law countries. Therefore, countries with Anglo-Saxon 
traditions or English colonies should have better investor rights, and thus also the former British 
colonies in Africa should have higher investor protection than for example French or German 
countries. However, the importance of country’s legal origin in this issue is not entirely agreed upon. 
Stulz and Williamson (2003) argue that culture should not be ignored in this discussion. They argue 
that country’s dominant religion predicts investor right’s better than for example language, or even 
better than country’s openness to international trade and the origin of its legal system. Also Bebchuk 
and Roe (1999) remind that corporate rules and regulations that will be chosen and persist over time 
in any country are dependent on the strength of relevant interest groups. Thus, although for example 
the religious base of a country might have changed over time, the same rules can persist anyhow, if 
there are strong enough authorities who are able to impede any changes on regulation that this kind 
of change could have caused in other markets. 
 
As mentioned, Stulz and Williamson (2003) argue that religion can predict legal environment. They 
find that countries with Catholic or other religion background protect their investor rights less than 
Protestant countries. Therefore, those African countries, which were under either British or German 
rule during the colonial period should have better investor protection than for example former French 
or Spanish colonies. Although Stulz and Williamson and La Porta et al. (1998) have disagreed on the 
best determinant for level of legal protection, both premises suggest that countries with British origin 
would have better legal protection. When it comes to legal enforcement, Stulz and Williamson (2003) 
find that Protestant countries also have stronger enforcement of rights than Catholic countries, and 
overall Christian countries have better enforcement than others. 
 
3.5 African corporate governance 
 
Here we will present literature that has addressed corporate governance especially in Africa, and lay 
the ground for addressing especially the possible governance recommendations that could reflect 
African economy and culture. Therefore, we shall describe examples on how governance codes have 
been developed previously and what has been the driving force for changes in them. 
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3.5.1 Efficient governance practices 
 
As mentioned, Africa has had much less attention in many research areas, including corporate 
governance. In this section we will present relevant research that has been done about the corporate 
governance particularly in Africa. Much of the research suggests that African countries have 
promoted corporate governance practices similar to those prevalent in developed countries (see for 
example Munisi et al., 2014), of which one example is the introduction of corporate governance 
codes. 
 
The general view is that different corporate governance mechanism can be used as a substitute for 
each other (Munisi et al., 2014). Ownership concentration should theoretically be an efficient 
governance mechanism in many places in Africa, where the access to global financial markets is 
difficult (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997), as large shareholders can monitor the management better than 
many scattered small shareholders could. However, Tsegba and Ezi-Herbert (2011) have found that 
ownership structures such as concentrated ownership or dominant shareholders do not have 
significant effect on firm performance in Nigeria, and therefore their use as corporate governance 
mechanisms to improve performance should be reconsidered. This ineffectiveness may be partly due 
to crony capitalism, and to large block holders who can extract rents the same way as managers might 
(Ayogu, 2001). Therefore, it is still possible that concentrated ownership and its mechanisms, when 
applied in markets with less corruption and with better minority shareholder protection, could be the 
answer to what governance practices should be adopted. However, the findings of Tsegba and Ezi-
Herbert show that the effectiveness of concentrated ownership as a governance mechanism on 
performance is debatable, especially in corrupt markets. 
 
If we take the view that in markets where external governance mechanisms and external financial 
markets are undeveloped companies should rely more on internal governance mechanisms, then 
particularly the board of directors and its characteristics become important governance mechanisms 
(Munisi et al., 2014). Generally larger boards are considered to be less effective in decision making, 
and increasing board size has been found to be negatively correlated with firm performance (Hermalin 
& Weisbach, 2001).  Nonetheless, there have also been findings that would suggest that actually larger 
boards would enhance corporate performance and shareholder value in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and 
South Africa (Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007), and therefore at least in African context larger boards 
could actually be effective. Although legislation may allow very different board sizes, the trend in 
public companies in developed markets seems to be developing into Anglo-Saxon norm of smaller 
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boards between 9 and 12 directors, rather than German norm with large boards of over 20 people on 
average (see Kraakman, Armour, Davies, Enriques, Hansmann, Hertig, & Hopt, 2009, p. 70). Munisi 
et al. state that differently structured boards have an effect on ownership structures as well. They find 
that increasing board size is negatively associated with concentrated, insider or state-ownership in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. This means that for example powerful large owners already have mechanisms 
other than boards for monitoring or inside owners do not need the advisory role of large and 
diversified boards. However, Tsegba and Ezi-Herbert (2011) have found that insider ownership is 
negatively correlated with firm performance in Nigeria. Therefore, there are contradictory findings 
on the effectiveness of insider ownership as a governance mechanism. Shareholder monitoring over 
insider ownership should be encouraged as it may lower firm performance, but at the same time 
insider ownership seems to encourage smaller boards, which are considered more effective. Thus, the 
effectiveness of insider ownership as a governance mechanism is debatable. 
 
Also Munisi et al. (2014) find that state-ownership is positively associated with the proportion of 
outside directors and negatively associated with board size in Africa. Government ownership can 
therefore encourage effective governance practices, such as smaller boards. However, state-
ownership is usually seen as a poor example of good corporate governance, as these boards might 
lack independence, expertise or pursue different agendas than firm’s strategy would be (Rossouw, 
2005). Therefore, the positive correlation with outsider ownership does not necessarily mean more 
independence, although the directors would be non-executives and technically independent, as the 
directors can pursue agendas that are especially important to the national economy and political 
environment rather than financial performance and shareholder value. However, the findings of 
Munisi et al. are somewhat contradictory to the view that government ownership would be an 
ineffective governance mechanism, as they do seem to correlate with smaller boards in large parts of 
Africa. These findings are also contradictory to expectations and general view of board effectiveness 
described earlier. Thus, it is possible that even though state-ownership would decrease board size and 
therefore ostensibly make boards more effective, larger board sizes would actually be more suitable 
for firms in African environment as only large owners and state would not get represented in the board 
to pursue their own interests. 
 
Separation of the board of directors and management is a debatable subject, as inside directors can 
have knowledge and expertise to make decisions that would enhance firm value, but at the same time 
the supervision of management would not be as effective (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Also management 
can pursue other interests and spend resources on empire building more easily, if they also a long 
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term board member. This can also be seen in Africa, where a study of four countries show that when 
the CEO of the company is also a chairman of the board, the shareholders’ value is affected negatively 
(Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007). Although the sample size of Kyereboah-Coleman’s study is small, it is 
consistent with previous research on CEOs and board of directors, and the findings are therefore more 
credible. Therefore, as also in Africa CEO as a chairman seems to affect negatively firm value for 
shareholders, the governance codes should address this issue by recommending the separation of the 
CEO position and Chairman of the board.  
 
Compensation has remained as an important and controversial topic especially in developed markets, 
as the recent financial crises and scandals have brought these issues to the attention of the public 
again. However, there is relatively little evidence of executive remuneration mechanisms in emerging 
markets (Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013). However, remuneration is also an issue in developing markets, 
where the gap between rich and poor is large (Scholtz & Smit, 2012), and where the underlying 
information asymmetry in the society is large and corporate governance is traditionally weak 
(Theeravanich, 2013). Performance related compensation schemes are considered an answer to the 
agency-problems which arise due to diffused ownership in Anglo-Saxon countries by aligning the 
interests of managers and small shareholders, as otherwise managers could control their own 
payments at the expense of shareholders (Luo, 2013). Due to differences in ownership structure and 
market features, the same compensation methods and principles might not work as well in emerging 
markets, as the causes and backgrounds for problems are different. For example, in closely held 
companies problems may arise as owners may compensate managers for pursuing their personal 
interests rather than overall long-term shareholder value (Theeravanich). Also the managerial markets 
in developing countries are many times underdeveloped, as top executives are often selected from 
government officials or family members (Luo). Therefore, the same compensation principles that 
apply in Anglo-Saxon countries, with highly developed and competitive managerial markets and 
diffused ownership for example, would not work as well in emerging markets.  
 
The findings on emerging markets suggest that agency-based compensation methods are used in 
companies with strong governance, while weaker governance would lead to entrenchment-based 
profit skimming (negotiating) mechanisms (Luo, 2013). Luo also suggests that in family and state-
owned companies the compensation mechanisms are often based on relationships and fixed payments 
rather than performance. Therefore, especially in the case of high state or family-ownership, extensive 
information disclosure and criteria for executive payments should be encouraged both in emerging 
and developed markets to assure shareholders that their interests are being pursued. Also having 
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shareholders approving the remuneration policies of directors and managers and appointing 
remuneration committees should increase the accountability of executives to shareholders (Scholtz & 
Smit, 2012). 
 
There has also been a comparative evaluation of the level of corporate governance in numerous 
countries by La Porta et al. (1998). This study included also four African countries: Nigeria, Kenya, 
South Africa and Zimbabwe. The research showed that in terms of credit rights African countries in 
the sample scored higher than average, expect for South Africa. However, South Africa scored higher 
than average and significantly higher than other African countries in the sample on shareholder rights. 
However, in rule-of-law category, all of the African countries scored lower than the average for the 
English origin group, with Nigeria and Zimbabwe having significantly lower level of governance in 
terms law enforcement. Therefore, the weak legal environment is significant aspect of good quality 
corporate governance, and there are major differences between African countries as well in this 
aspect. The enforcement of the governance codes should therefore be addressed with more emphasis 
if the benefits of governance should be achieved. However, not even South Africa can score highest 
of all of the African countries on all aspects, so therefore there is no clear result on which country 
would have the best quality governance overall. However, on many aspects South Africa seems to 
have a sophisticated and well-developed governance system in place, as the shareholder rights and 
stakeholder engagement seem to have had more attention than elsewhere. Historically South Africa 
has not been a model example of sophisticated and developed country, and for example the crime 
rates have been significantly high and the foreign investments have not been easy to obtain for 
example because of the instability of its neighbouring countries and its own apartheid past (Vaughn 
& Verstegen Ryan, 2006). Thus, the reforms and positive results of South Africa could be replicated 
in time in other countries in Africa as well. However, it is clear that the legal enforcement is a major 
problem in all of the countries in this sample, and as the countries in the sample of La Porta el al. 
(1998) are amongst the richest countries in the continent, it could be assumed that the problem lies 
even bigger in the poorer countries of Africa. 
 
3.5.2 African governance codes 
 
A specific characteristic that differs from Western cultures is the African value system called Ubuntu, 
which signifies a broad understanding of coexistence, consensus, and consultation (Rossouw, 2005). 
Mangaliso (2001) describes Ubuntu as humanness, spirit of caring and community, and as 
responsiveness. As the basis for the value system of the culture is broader than it might be in some 
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European countries traditionally, making only the interests of shareholders and accountability to them 
the objective of corporate governance should be impossible in Africa. Although still, it is possible 
that countries have followed, so to speak, too closely the example of their colonizers in understanding 
of whose interests matter. However, at the moment as there is a constantly growing interest on 
corporate responsibility and accountability in developed markets too, we should not take for granted 
the general views on what and who matter in business in each market.  
 
There is still a shortage of collective corporate governance code analysis on African countries. One 
of the few studies that refer to corporate governance codes or recommendations in Africa collectively 
is by G.J. Rossouw, whose research in 2005 examined different governance reports and codes of 
eleven African countries. Rossouw (2005) identifies general patterns in the institutionalisation of 
corporate governance and describes how relationship between corporate governance and business 
ethics is understood. The role and responsibility of board is a major similarity in many of the African 
corporate governance recommendations. Also Rossouw finds that all of the countries in his sample 
except Nigeria have adopted an inclusive model of governance of some extent and stated a need for 
regular stakeholder engagement. Board of directors is not only accountable to shareholders but to all 
stakeholders of the company in all other countries, except in Nigeria which did not commit explicitly 
to this inclusive model of corporate governance. Especially local communities and the society have 
been set apart from other stakeholders. 
 
Therefore it would be assumed that ubuntu can be seen as a relevant influence for governance codes 
in majority of the countries in this study’s sample as well, but as we have increased the sample size 
from Rossouw’s (2005) research and for example Nigeria has updated its previous code since 
Rossouw’s research, it is not known how many and to what extent countries have now adopted and 
recommended this inclusive model of corporate governance. It is also possible that the new 
governance codes would have followed the example of a more traditional shareholder centred view 
in their recommendations, or focused on issues such as executive remuneration, which has been a 
prevailing and discussed topic in developed countries’ corporate governance since the financial crisis. 
Thus, focusing on such issues is possible if their driver for corporate governance code development 
in African countries has been exogenous, and if the codes are merely a result of copying their former 
colonizer’s code and their issues.  
 
Governance, institutions and regulation of African countries may have their roots in country’s colonial 
past, and they can affect how governance and markets have since then developed. Following a suitable 
 32 
 
colonizer may have had positive effects on today’s markets. For example, La Porta et al. (1998) 
emphasise the significance of the colonial origin on development, and have found that former British 
colonies with common-law background have better property rights and financial markets than other 
colonies. However, based on the contingency theory, there can be problems in mirroring too closely 
the colonising power’s legislation and codes. 
 
The South African King Report (King I, 1994) was revolutionary for the development of African 
corporate governance (Okike, 2007). It is remarkable that it introduced a corporate governance model 
which was much wider than the ground-breaking Cadbury Report only a few years earlier. The 
purpose of the King Report was to advocate for the highest standards of corporate governance in the 
interests of a wide range of stakeholders, and that companies need to “recognise that they no longer 
act independently from the societies and the environment” (King Report, 1994). Since then the code 
has been revised twice and it emphasises the importance of the triple bottom line with economic, 
ecological and social aspects (Okike). This is a clear evidence that the government and the committee 
that was commissioned to conduct the report took into account their environment’s culture, value 
systems and African worldview. Therefore, the South African example of developing the corporate 
governance code can be viewed as more of an endogenously driven, as it has not merely mirrored the 
recommendations of previous codes or even its colonizer’s code. It has also been argued that revisions 
to the King Reports will attempt to steer even further from the “Eurocentric” approach to corporate 
governance but at the same time issue even stricter demands for governance in international 
investment communities (Rossouw, Watt & Malan, 2002). 
 
One good example of a less successful development of corporate governance practices is from 
Nigeria, which has been described by Okike (2007). Mimicking the United Kingdom’s Company’s 
Act in Nigeria initially lead to the overlooking of Nigeria’s peculiar social and political environment. 
While becoming independent Nigeria, like many other colonies, inherited many rules and regulations 
from their former colonizer Great Britain. During the colonial period Nigeria was introduced with the 
British company law and thus Nigeria’s laws as well as corporate governance practices reflected the 
British system and practices. After gaining independence, Nigeria had to replace their old British 
company law by their own in 1968. However, this law also mirrored the British Company Act of 1948 
very closely, as many British people still controlled much of the business activities in the country. 
Therefore, in the case of Nigeria the development of governance was highly exogenous. However, 
the corporate governance instructions of this act did not suit the environment of Nigeria, with tribal 
conflicts, corruption and rapid economic development. Although Great Britain has had its own 
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corruption problems, they are mostly intangible and involve mainly marginal groups, and therefore 
the Company Act of United Kingdom do not address these issues enough to be appropriate and 
effective for Nigerian environment. Even strong governance codes and recommendations are not 
effective when supportive macro-economic and political and social institutions are not in place 
(Ahunwan, 2002), and therefore the recommendations of UK did not suit Nigeria. It has been widely 
agreed that the recent corporate failures of Nigeria have been a result of weak corporate governance 
(Nigerian Code of Corporate Governance, 2011). Therefore, after the previous problems, Nigeria 
finally developed its own corporate governance code in 2003, and although the timing can be viewed 
to be in the front line of African codes, it can be argued that the code became much too late in the 
fight of corruption in Nigeria. Also it is suspicious that this Nigerian Code did not identify corruption 
as an issue for the country (Okike), and thus it could be assumed that this first code still mimicked 
too closely the example of Great Britain and lacked context specific recommendations to be truly 
credible and effective. 
 
Although Okike (2007) found that although Nigeria has improved their corporate governance system 
and changed their recommendations from the original copy of the UK Company’s Act, Okike still 
doubted that the governance mechanisms in place were effective, as for example the penalties for not-
compliance were weak. In addition to Okike, Ahunwan (2002) has found that even though Nigeria 
has made some progress in its corporate governance reforms, such as reforms in the capital markets 
which have increased the activity in the stock markets and privatisation of state-owned companies, 
the reform efforts and formal laws, are not likely to be truly successful if the underlying problems in 
Nigerian society (e.g. poverty or tribal tensions) are not addressed first. 
 
Okike (2007) suggests that rather than developing Nigerian corporate governance practices and codes 
by following the example of more advanced economies, such as Great Britain, the country should 
rather follow the path given by South Africa, as it has developed a broader understanding of what 
governance should entail and the overall contexts are more similar in Nigeria and South Africa. 
Nigeria has since the publishing of its first official corporate governance code issued a revised code 
in 2011. Hence, it would be desirable that in this revised code issues such as corruption would be 
acknowledged. Besides differences in economic and institutional development, more advanced 
countries generally have lower levels of corruption, and therefore their codes and guidelines are not 
perfectly suitable for countries such as Nigeria. This view can be extended to apply to other African 
countries besides Nigeria as well, so therefore it can be suggested that following the codes of the 
more advanced former colonizer is not the most suitable path for developing a governance 
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recommendations that would be helpful in fighting corruption in the most problematic countries. 
Therefore, if the codes of the African countries mirror closely the codes of their former colonizer, but 
the country is for example on the bottom of the list in the corruption index, this would mean that the 
governance codes are not best suited for the situation in that country at the moment. 
 
Many of the studies related to corporate governance are focusing on the relationship between 
corporate governance and their effect on performance. However, Akinkoye and Olansamni (2014) 
have tried to inspect the level of compliance in Nigeria on their 2003 issued code of best practices in 
corporate governance. In their study, they found that on average the sample’s companies follow the 
recommendations on disclosure and financial transparency with a nearly 98 % level of compliance, 
but less than half of the companies in the sample follow the recommendations on compensation 
disclosure. Therefore, possibly problems of corruption and high power distance are reasons for not 
disclosing the compensations policies as profoundly as they would on other issues, and there might 
be more suspicion over the compensation policies of the companies. Although Nigeria is one of the 
richest countries in Africa, and its GDP has grown in recent years remarkably, the increasing poverty 
of its population also suggests indicates a highly skewed distribution of the wealth in the country. 
Therefore, it is possible that to avoid more public outrage and due to lack of pressure from corrupt 
state officials, compensation policies are left undisclosed. 
 
Developing and issuing a corporate governance code for each country is not enough however. The 
challenges of the African market, such as weak legal protection and corruption can still prevail, even 
though more countries would issue their own governance codes. Before, African corporate 
governance codes have not offered enough guidance on how business ethics should be implemented 
into corporate culture in practice (Rossouw, 2005). Only Kenya, Mauritius, and South Africa 
previously have explained at least partly what the ethical governing consists of besides issuing a 
governance code, with South Africa having the most comprehensive recommendations. Therefore, 
adopting the spirit of the codes in practice becomes a major issue for African corporate governance 
to succeed. 
 
In conclusion, based on the literature on African corporate governance thus far, there are research 
studies on successful adoption and development of corporate governance practices and mechanisms 
(e.g. South Africa) and more negative examples (e.g. Nigeria) (Okike, 2007). However, there is 
limited amount of literature on collective assessment of governance codes in Africa, and as new codes 
have emerged in recent years, it is important to update the literature from this perspective. Also as 
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much of the research focuses on individual examples, this study aims to collectively explain the 
governance recommendations of the continent 
 
3.6 Accounting and corruption 
 
3.6.1 Corruption 
 
Although major corporate governance literature is concerned about agency theory and reducing 
management expropriation, states, governments and public officials can also expropriate funds from 
companies through means of corruption. Transparency International (2004) has defined corruption as 
the abuse of entrusted power for private gain, and therefore we cannot limit the term only to concern 
public affairs. Corruption can be divided into public corruption (paying bribes to obtain goods that 
are monopolised by the government) and private-to-private corruption. Even in countries with 
relatively low levels of corruption, local corruption can feed the overall culture of corruption, which 
can in turn reinforce private and public corruption in the nation level (Dass, Nanda and Xiao, 2014). 
Therefore, the overall environment of the market can affect companies negatively, even though the 
companies would not submit to corruption themselves. 
 
Most of the researchers agree that corruption is a burden to the economy as it distorts decision making 
and can lead to suboptimal allocation of resources, as less productive or efficient practices get 
resources while more efficient alternatives will not (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993). The negative effects 
of corruption can easily multiply: it causes cynicism as people start to regard corruption as the norm 
of doing business and weakens social values as people find corruption as an easier path than legitimate 
transactions (Lawal, 2007).  Besides the misallocation of resources, the secrecy of bribery also makes 
it more costly to the economy than tax payments, which can be viewed as a sister-concept for 
corruption (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993). Also in developed markets with less corruption de jure, Dass 
et al. (2014) found that companies located in the more corrupt parts of United States have lower firm 
value than companies in less corrupt environments. 
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1993) have identified three different implications of how corrupt actions can 
work in different surroundings. Firstly, in many developed countries government goods can be 
obtained without paying bribes, thus resulting in corrupt acts would be unnecessary. Secondly in some 
areas, such as in Korea, if someone bribes a government official, they can be sure that they receive 
the permit of good for that and do not need to resort to anymore bribery in future. Dass et al. (2014) 
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also argue that companies dependent on the public sector are less affected by the negative effects of 
corruption in such circumstances. Thirdly, like in many African countries still today, even bribing 
numerous government officials will not necessarily guarantee that anymore bribes did not need to be 
paid later too. Therefore, resulting in corruption might only enhance the corrupt environment further, 
and worsen the situation of the companies in future. However, corruption policies affect companies 
inside specific countries differently too. Smaller firms may suffer of corruptive environment more 
than larger and more profitable firms, as smaller firms have less resources and funds to spend on 
bribes to shield themselves from state expropriation or to build political connections necessary in 
crony capitalistic markets (Durnev & Fauver, 2007).  
 
Although Stulz and Williamson (2003) suggest that Catholic and other religion (such as Islam) 
dominated countries have significantly higher levels of corruption than Protestant countries, Kimbro 
(2011) suggests that the relationships of being a highly corrupt country and poverty, low power 
distance and Catholicism or Islam are more indirect than could be assumed. Therefore, making such 
direct interpretations between religion and corruption should be cautious. Kimbro argues that rather 
than purely poverty, religion, values or culture, higher corruption on a country level is better explained 
through the lack of institutional development. Although it is not totally agreed on what makes a 
country more corrupt, it is commonly acknowledged that history affects corruption levels as 
corruption persists over time (Dass et al., 2014). Therefore, changing quickly from corrupt country 
to less corrupt with any accounting or other policies is not easy. Gabbioneta, Greenwood, Mazzola 
and Minoja (2013) expand the understanding of the importance of context in illegal corporate actions 
and support Kimbro’s argument that poor institutional development can explain high levels of 
corruption. Gabbioneta et al. state that institutional arrangements can encourage illegal actions 
through institutional endorsement and through providing ways for concealing illegality, for example, 
through regulatory loopholes. Also for example Okike (2007) states that having weak penalties for 
non-compliance, as in Nigeria, can in fact encourage non-compliance. As Nigeria is considered to be 
a highly corrupt country (Transparency International, 2014), it seems plausible that the institutional 
practices and legal enforcement would not condemn Nigerian companies enough for corruption. 
 
3.6.2 Governance in corrupt environments 
 
There is not clear evidence on how accounting procedures, such as corporate governance, affect 
processes of corruption. It is evident that accountants often have a good possibility to observe and 
discover wrongdoings in organisations because of their close connection to organisations' control and 
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auditing processes (Kimbro, 2011). Ideally therefore their role should be to prevent and discourage 
financial frauds and malpractices. However, Neu, Everett, Rahaman and Martinez (2013) suggest that 
accounting at the same time can limit but also enable and facilitate corruption, as a ”skilful” use of 
accounting methods and social interactions together can enable corruption even in developed markets. 
 
Therefore one of the major problems for corporate governance in relation to corruption is, whether 
companies in more corrupt countries can overcome the problems caused by corruption with stronger 
governance. This question has not had a unanimous answer among researchers. If companies operate 
in an environment where bribes are expected of them to achieve or attract business and corruption 
would affect all companies (i.e. companies are victims), then investments in better governance would 
be unnecessary. However, if the companies themselves feed and participate in the culture of 
corruption by rent-seeking, earnings management etc. then stronger governance mechanisms become 
more important as companies can improve their image and signal their better quality to investors 
through governance and overcome some of the harmful effects of corruption (Dass et al. 2014). 
Stronger internal governance thus assures that the control as well as cash flow rights of investors are 
protected, even if the external governance would be weak. Dass et al. Therefore, argue that higher 
quality corporate governance would be specially important and valuable to companies which operate 
in areas with higher local corruption, and overcome at least partly the corruption problems caused by 
weak institutions.  However, for example Durnev and Fauver (2007) argue that the positive effect of 
higher quality governance is weaker or even non-existent in more predatory states where corruption 
is evident. As has been mentioned, good quality corporate governance can improve firm-value, and 
thus benefit owners financially. Therefore, firms which operate in areas of more predatory states 
would have less reasons to practice good corporate governance, because even though the firm value 
would increase that would mean that there would also be more money available for outside 
expropriation (Durnev & Fauver). Therefore, the efforts of improved corporate governance would be 
made in vain. 
 
One of the basic governance practices that should reduce corruption is the transparency of business 
and information disclosure. Corrupt environments encourage less transparency and companies in such 
environments are more opaque (Dass et al., 2014). Companies may want do this, as they want to 
conceal their corrupt activities from investors or because they want to protect their wealth from 
outside expropriation. Thus, it has been found that firms in more corrupt areas disclose less 
information and have weaker governance overall (Durnev & Fauver, 2007). Therefore, wider 
information disclosure recommendations would be one of the governance practices that could in 
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theory reduce corruption. However, as corruption tends to persist and if the level of corruption is high 
enough, even those who would not want to engage in corrupt activities might not have any other 
practical solution (Dass et al.). In a culture of corruption companies might not feel enough pressure 
to adhere to these rules, thus making stronger legal enforcement increasingly more important but also 
the passing of time becomes important as corruption is very persistent. In this regard the comply-or-
explain model might not be the most adequate enforcement mechanism, and thus much of the 
information disclosure requirements should be expressed in binding regulation. Thus, encouraging 
disclosure that goes beyond than mandatory information disclosure in the governance codes is 
considered as a mean of fighting and minimising corrupt acts. 
 
Intense competition in the industry can be viewed as a substitute for weak internal corporate 
governance if the prevailing environment is more corrupt (Dass et al. 2014). This means that both 
competition and internal governance mechanisms may be used together in corrupt markets, but no 
remarkable impact of competition has been found in less corrupt environments. This means that lack 
of competition and improvements in internal governance mechanism can be especially harmful in 
corrupt environments. 
 
In paper many of the laws and regulations, which should reduce and hinder corruption and other 
violations, already exist in many African countries’ legislation, but their effectiveness in practice is 
not evident (Ayogu, 2001). It has been suggested for example in South Africa that rather than building 
corporate governance on the light regulatory touch of comply-or-explain model, corporate 
governance standards should be based on stronger approaches, such as the US hard law Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (King III, 2009). However, as it is pointed out in the King III report, United States was the 
major source for the recent financial crisis, and therefore following this line of standards would not 
necessarily reduce the risk of systemic financial and economic crises in Africa. However, Dass et al. 
(2014) suggest that all firms can benefit from exogenous shocks to corporate governance (such as 
Sarbanes Oxley Act in United States) but even more so if they are in corrupt environments. Therefore, 
in theory adopting a more hard law based corporate governance standards (such as minimum 
standards) even in a corrupt country should increase the benefits of good governance for companies, 
such as higher valuation. 
 
3.7 Comparative governance code research 
 
There have been some collective corporate governance guideline comparisons done in the past, which 
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describe which areas of corporate governance are addressed in national codes, both in developed and 
in emerging markets. Here we shall describe two reports by law firm Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP 
from 2000. The markets in the report include for example such countries as USA, United Kingdom, 
Belgium, and the Netherlands, and from emerging markets Brazil, Mexico, Thailand and South Africa 
and so forth. According to these comparisons, at the time of the study, much of the same issues are 
not covered comprehensively in guidelines in either markets. For example, the separation of the 
chairman and CEO, and the formal evaluation of CEO have not been addressed in many of the 
guidelines in emerging markets nor in some of the developed markets. Also such themes as 
shareholder voting powers and voting practices have not been covered at all in many of the developed 
countries, and nearly in none of the developing countries. However, the role of board of directors as 
well as the mix of inside and outside directors have been well-addressed in both markets’ guidelines 
already by 2000, and also the definition of independence has been covered in all of the countries at 
least somehow. 
 
Evidently however, some issues are much better covered in the guidelines of developed markets, such 
as guidelines on executive compensation. Although not all developed countries listed in the study 
address this issue in their codes either, in emerging markets relatively more countries have not covered 
the topic at all in their guidelines. Somewhat more surprisingly all of the emerging countries in the 
comparison define guidelines or at least covers partly the subject of board interaction with 
institutional investors, press, customers etc., while some of the developed markets, most notably 
USA, have not addressed this issue at all at the time. However, it is notable that for example in the 
South African King I from 1994 it is stated officially that “It [is] better to keep a link forged with all 
stakeholders rather than one or two institutions.” This is in line with the African value system, which 
has been discussed earlier, which highlights the importance of society and other stakeholders, rather 
than just shareholders. Therefore, this in line also with our expectation of inclusion of other 
stakeholders’ interests in the codes. Thus, from previous research of governance codes we can see 
aspects that relate specifically to the country characteristics other than market sophistication or 
development, but rather to society, culture and values. 
 
However, as these comparisons of different codes were conducted over a decade ago, there most 
probably has been some improvements or changes in these issues when codes have been revised and 
updated. However, these reports point out that issues such as board independence and transparency 
of compensation policies, which have been much talked about after and during different financial 
scandals and crises, have been truly lagging in the governance codes in emerging markets as well. 
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There has also been a comparative study on European Union member states governance codes, 
commissioned in 2002. In this study the codes are described as having remarkable similarities 
especially in terms of supervisory body’s role and responsibility recommendations. Both in unitary 
and two-tier systems the boards have both supervisory and managerial duties, although in the two-
tier system these functions have been formally separated. The greatest difference in the codes is 
related to the role of employees in corporate governance, for example in the right of electing members 
to supervisory bodies. However, as they point out in the report, this difference is many times 
embedded in law rather than just in corporate governance codes. Relevant to our study is the fact that 
in Germany the employees have said right, in France companies may provide such rights, but in all 
other member states, such as Great Britain or Spain, shareholders alone have the right to elect all 
members of supervisory body. All codes emphasise the need for a supervisory body that is separate 
and distinct from management; however, other codes recommend a unitary board structure and others 
a two-tier system. This is the second big difference in the codes inside European Union. In Germany 
and Netherlands for example the two-tier system is dominant, but in the majority of EU the unitary 
board structure is prevailing.  
 
3.8 Summary 
 
This section has described the literature that is relevant for this research. Based on these findings, we 
can conclude that context and environment can form the limits and opportunities for an organisation 
to build and develop effective corporate governance mechanisms. For example, Klapper and Love 
(2004) have argued that companies have only limited possibilities and flexibility to develop their own 
governance, as country characteristics, such as economic development and legal protection, affect the 
level of governance. Good corporate governance can be especially beneficial in environments which 
suffer from corruption or weak legal protection, as investors are willing to pay high price premiums 
for better governance in these areas (Chen et al. 2009). 
 
The literature suggests that issuing an effective national corporate governance code in African 
countries should not only be a copy of their colonial power’s example, but the codes should take into 
account the cultural and socio-economic situation in said country. Especially internal governance 
mechanisms, such as effective board of directors, should be well addressed in the governance codes. 
As the external financial markets are less developed in most of the continent, it could be assumed that 
the codes would not focus on external governance mechanisms in detail, and therefore for example 
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anti-takeover mechanisms would not be addressed profoundly in the codes. These governance codes 
should also address issues that are relevant problems to the county’s economy, such as corruption, for 
the code to be credible and efficient in practice. If such issues are left unaddressed, investors might 
not regard the governance code to be credible enough for higher premiums, and therefore the benefits 
of adopting a corporate governance code for firms are reduced. Next section will now describe the 
methodology of the research, as well as the data criteria, selection and collection. 
4 Research design 
 
4.1 Methodology 
 
The objectives of this study are addressed using archival research techniques, with using public 
information of different countries’ policies and recommendations on corporate governance. Archival 
research refers to conducting a study using data that the researcher has not collected themselves, but 
the researcher selects the data to be analysed from already available and existing data (McBurney & 
White, 2009 p. 228). The data that is already available is suitable for the objectives of this study, as 
the aim is not to find out if the companies are actually following the guidelines in practice, but to 
compare the already existing governance codes against each other. These national corporate 
governance codes are public information and available on the Internet. Therefore, archival research 
is an appropriate method for this study. 
 
This method was also chosen because it allows the possibility of examining multiple countries at the 
same time, as one of the objectives of the study is to collectively analyse the corporate governance 
codes of Africa. This method also enables comparing both African and European guidelines together. 
In addition, according to McBurney and White (2009) archival research allows a flexible and 
inductive theory development in the research. The data and theory can be revisited multiple times 
during the research period, without compromising the objectivity of the data due to subjective 
reasons. The data therefore is not subjected to limitations or problems such as wrongly chosen 
interviewees, incorrectly and vaguely constructed interview or survey questions, or rushed and 
misunderstood answers to said questions. The objective of this study is not to address, whether these 
codes are actually used or not in the majority of companies operating in the countries; hence, 
additional empirical research methods, such as surveys and questionnaires, are not used. 
 
The comparison of different countries will be made based on selected areas of corporate governance. 
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Therefore, the research may leave out some specific areas that are not relevant or do not exist in all 
of the governance codes. The areas selected represent the most significant parts of corporate 
governance in many countries, and therefore should be addressed in most of the codes at least partly. 
As one of the advantages of the archival research is the possibility to revisit data multiple of times, 
we have been able to include issues that were initially thought to be self-evident or not as important  
for our research, but which appeared to be recommended differently in many codes, and thus, were 
finally included in the study. Also, we have elected areas such as governing business ethics and 
stakeholder inclusion that should be relevant and interesting aspects of corporate governance 
especially in the case of Africa. The areas of governance are divided as follows: board of directors, 
remuneration of board members and top management, shareholder rights, other stakeholders’ 
inclusion, disclosure, enforcement of the provisions and corruption. Also the origin of the code is 
addressed. We have also used the mortality rate estimates from Acemoglu et al. (2001) to address, 
whether the mortality rates between countries with or without corporate governance codes are of 
significantly different levels. 
 
Last section, which is related to corruption, will both explain, how problems of corruption and illegal 
acts have been addressed and identified in the codes, and how they relate to their position in the 
corruption index of Transparency International, the Corruption Perception Index from 2014. This 
index has been chosen for this study as it is the leading global index for corruption on a national level, 
and therefore it is both credible and reliable, as well as suitable for national level corruption 
assessment. The index ranks countries based on their perceived levels of corruption, which have been 
defined by opinion surveys and expert assessments (Transparency International, 2014).  
 
The Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) used is from the year 2014, so 
that the results would be most topical. We have also used various other years to represent those years 
before every code in the study was issued to determine, if there is a difference between the corruption 
level of each county before and after the newest code. The CPI from 2014 lists 175 countries and 
territories which are the most and least corrupt countries in the world. The method of this section is 
to compare this index to the governance policies of different countries. Firstly it will be addressed, 
whether the countries that are considered to be more corrupt have in place any kind of national 
corporate governance codes or policies or not. This will be useful way of addressing the question 
whether more corrupt countries have even recognised the need for a governance code. Next step is to 
assess, does the corruption rate show in the actual policies defined in the national codes. For example, 
identifying corruption as a major issue in country’s governance in the codes is assessed, as well as 
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the information disclosure requirements’ scope and the enforcement of the code. Thirdly it is 
addressed, whether the African countries that have a corporate governance code in place have higher 
average scores in the CPI than African countries in general. 
 
The comparative and corruption analyses will be both qualitative and quantitative. This way we can 
best address, whether the codes are relevant and suitable for the African environment, but also address 
through the quantitative analysis, whether the codes have an effect on corruption levels of countries. 
As the definitions of governance and understandings of what corporate governance code should 
include differ between the countries of our sample, we have used qualitative methods to analyse the 
codes. Thus, we have minimised the problems, which might occur if we focused only on issues 
present in European codes, as this way we can ensure that we focus on the spirit of the code and 
recommendations as a whole, rather than only look for identical recommendations between colonies 
and colonizers. 
 
First, the issues chosen for the comparative study, such as board of directors’ characteristics or 
structure recommendations, from each European country will be listed. Then the recommendations 
on the same issue from the codes of African countries, which used to be that European country’s 
former colonies, are listed and compared against it. Here we will both compare the African codes to 
the European one, i.e. what are the similarities or are they different to each other, but also next to each 
other. Also the codes will be compared against the OECD Principles for Corporate Governance, as it 
is considered to be the international benchmark for developing corporate governance codes. Each 
code is analysed qualitatively to determine the profoundly the meaning of the guideline and its 
appropriateness to the emerging market environment. The same wordings were not required for 
guideline to be qualified as similar to that of the other country, but rather the actual meaning and 
intention of the guideline was considered.  
 
As research of the comparison will be qualitative, and it will not address any points on either “good” 
or “bad” practices to countries, the countries will not be ranked against each other officially. As there 
has been no consensus on the most efficient practices for example in relation to board of directors’ 
structure, making strict rankings not be as beneficial as qualitative analysis. However, we do address 
whether these countries have recognised their own situation when developing these codes, for 
example have they identified their own problematic issues for quality governance, such as corruption, 
or have they adopted such governance practice recommendations that according to theory should be 
more suitable for emerging economies. Therefore, issues such as the functioning and independence 
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of the board of directors, remuneration, and separation of management and board of directors are 
addressed. This way we do address which countries have developed codes that would we suitable for 
their environment, for example in relation to corruption, values or minority rights. Also it is addressed, 
have countries mimicked the governance recommendations of more developed countries even though 
they would not be the most suitable or practical for their own environment. 
 
Before the colonisation Africa was not divided into clearly bordered nation states, and thus the 
colonies can be partly divided between two colonizers. Therefore, for example in the case of Morocco 
both Spanish and French governance codes will be compared against the Moroccan code. Also as 
German lost its colonies after the First World War to other European countries, both German codes 
and the new colonizer’s codes have been taken into account in the comparison. Thus, these countries, 
Ghana and Nigeria are compared especially against both German and British corporate governance 
recommendations. In the tables these countries are placed next to Germany for practical reasons. 
 
We should also point out that the results described in tables are not direct quotes from the corporate 
governance codes, but have been abbreviated and/or summarised, so that the basic idea of the code 
would fit in the table format better. However, they have not been altered so much that the underlying 
idea of the recommendation would be altered in any way. 
 
Also it is important to point out the differences in major terminology. In English, the word director is 
used to describe the members of the unitary board, whether or not they are also managers, while in 
French the equivalent word is used only for managers or executives. The members of the board are 
called administrateur. In the Spanish code, the executive and non-executive directors are called 
internal (executive) and external or (non-executive or independent) directors. Also non-executive 
directors who are shareholder representatives are called proprietary directors, excluding them this 
way from independent non-executive directors. In this study, the word director will be used to 
describe a member of the unitary board, and for two-tier systems the terms supervisory board member 
and managerial board member are used. Also terms non-executive and executive directors are used 
instead of external and internal directors. 
 
4.2 Data collection 
 
As data, we are using readily available data and information found from the Internet. No additional 
data was used, such as interviews or surveys. The data has been collected manually from different 
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corporate governance codes and from the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index of 
2014 during February and March in 2015. 
 
In the first part of the study, where the objective is to compare different national codes together, we 
are using corporate governance recommendations called for example codes, manuals, guidelines or 
principles as the material. This has been done so that any meaningful guideline would not be 
overlooked in the sample just because of different wordings. In the second part of the study, we are 
using the same governance codes as well as the corruption index as data. 
 
There is a lot of material concerning the corporate governance for many of the countries that are 
studied here. In some countries there are numerous direct laws and regulations, or listing requirements 
for stock exchanges. To assess, which governance recommendations would classify as corporate 
governance codes to be used, we use a criteria introduced in the study on behalf of the European 
Commission in 2002, which is described below: 
 
– a systematically arranged set of principles, standards, best practices and/or recommendations 
– precatory in nature; 
– that is neither legally nor contractually binding; 
– relating to the internal governance of corporations; and 
– issued by a collective body. 
 
This criteria will therefore leave out for example firm-specific governance codes or books on 
corporate governance. Although these might be influential to other companies in the area as well, the 
scale of the study would become too large if such documents would be included. General governance 
codes for public firms are included in the data, as well as general best practice guidelines. Under this 
definition, national regulation does not fit into the criteria due to its legal validity. However, they may 
be used as a reference point if needed, but are not included in the main comparison. 
 
The sample is limited to those European countries, which had colonial dominions in Africa at some 
point between years 1881 and 1914. This period was chosen because it marks the period often called 
as the Scramble of Africa, when approximately 90 % of the continent was under European control. 
The African countries included in the sample are those countries, which were under some European 
county’s control during this period. Only Liberia and Ethiopia are therefore excluded from the study 
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due to this criteria. As this time period is the most notorious invasion period in African history, the 
sample therefore will be the most comprehensive from both European and African perspective. 
 
The data collection has been done using the Internet search engines. Governance codes for each 
individual country have been found using the English name of each country. European Corporate 
Governance Institute’s (ECGI) website has an index for codes available for different countries, and 
has many of the African codes on its website. Many of the codes, both European and African, have 
been selected through this archive. As the index does not list all of the African national codes currently 
in place, some of the codes have been found through different channels, mainly through Google 
search. These countries include Botswana, Nigeria (newest update not available on ECGI website), 
Uganda, and Zimbabwe. All other countries’ codes have been taken from the ECGI website. 
 
Also only codes written in either English or French are included in the study for practical reasons, 
and to minimize any possibilities for misinterpretations and mistranslations. If the codes are available 
both in French and English, the English version has been used if the versions are similar. Although 
the French version is described as being the official one for Tunisia and Morocco, we have used the 
English version for final data collection after we have first examined that both versions are equal both 
in size and substance. The Algerian code is the only code that was available only in French. Also the 
newest Egyptian code was only available in Arabic, so we have used the previous version which was 
available both in French and English too. 
 
For each country, the newest official version of codes have been used if possible. Therefore, intended 
updates or drafts to codes have not been used as a primary source of data. Therefore, for example the 
Kenyan draft from 2014 has not been the source of data for the actual results, as it is possible that due 
to comments received some of the changes to previous code recommendations will not make through 
to the official update. Many of the European countries also have more than one governance code in 
place, so we have used the newest general or combined corporate governance code update to find 
comparative and comprehensive information for each country. Many times updates to codes only 
relate to a specific part of the corporate governance practices, for example to a specific sector, such 
as the financial and banking sector. Therefore, these specific codes have not been used, as they do not 
serve the purpose of this study, as they do not address the country’s governance recommendations on 
a general level. However, the previous codes have been examined to make a more profound 
assessment of the development of the codes and to have the possibility to compare, what has been 
changed from the previous code in relation to important issues that will be discussed in chapter 6. 
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However, if there is no mention of specific issues on the official codes, national laws and regulations 
have been used as a material and source of data, if some information would actually be in the 
jurisdiction of binding regulation. This is done to minimise the possible misinterpretations that would 
occur if information otherwise considered e.g. basic knowledge would be found in the legislation 
rather than in the country’s governance code. Therefore, we have looked for national company laws 
when there has been no mention of some issue in the governance code itself. If the results in the tables 
come from legislation, it has been marked in the results table with *.  However, the primary data is 
the governance codes of each country, and therefore some of the recommendations and guidelines 
taken from the corporate governance codes might also be in the legislation, such as recommendations 
for board structure of unitary or dual board system. Therefore, if the data has been taken from the 
governance code, but the same information might also be found in country’s corporate legislation, the 
results have not been marked with *. This has been done as the primary objective of this research is 
to compare the voluntary or comply-or-explain based governance codes together, as they represent 
better the sophistication and best practice level of governance because of their flexibility and 
contingency approach. 
 
These African countries currently have a suitable governance code that meets the criteria in place: 
Algeria, Botswana, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, 
Tunisia, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. The European codes which would be suitable for the study are those 
of United Kingdom, France, Spain, Portugal, Germany, Italy, Russia, and Belgium, as those are the 
countries that had African colonies during the chosen time period. However, Belgium, Russia, Italy 
and Portugal, have to be excluded as none of their former colonies have a governance code in place 
at the moment.  Also Tanzania and Zambia are mentioned having a corporate governance code in 
Rossouw’s (2005) research paper, but we were not able to find such codes or they did not qualify with 
our code criteria. 
 
In addition to these, the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004) will be used in the study 
as an overall comparative guideline. The OECD principles’ objective is to improve corporate 
performance, competitiveness and access to capital on an international level, and it is considered to 
be one of the most internationally important guideline for governance, and thus it is important to 
compare guidelines to it collectively as well. We are using the official version from 2004 instead of 
any newer versions for several reasons. First of all, the 2014 overall corporate governance principles 
are in a draft stage, and therefore are not yet official. Also, as many of the corporate governance codes 
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of our study sample are older ones, it is more plausible that if they have used the OECD guidelines 
as a reference point or a model for their own codes, they probably would have used the 2004 
guidelines as the newer one was not even drafted during their code development. Lastly, many of the 
newer guidelines are directed at specific company structures, and as we have excluded such codes 
from our sample on a country level, it is appropriate that we do not include them in the OECD 
guidelines either.  
 
Therefore, in total 13 African corporate governance codes or guidelines and four European 
governance codes will be used in this study. Also we shall take the international OECD corporate 
governance guideline as a reference point to the study. The majority of the guidelines describe the 
recommendations for corporations listed in stock exchanges, but many of the codes also indicate that 
the given recommendations can also be used by private companies and state-owned companies. 
  
The result are divided into categories eight different categories: origin of the code, board of directors, 
remuneration, shareholder rights, stakeholder rights, disclosure, enforcement, and corruption. The 
main comparative elements have been described in each table, and the tables have been divided to 
represent the different colonizers so that the comparisons are easier to see and analyse next to each 
other. The first table of each category is always of United Kingdom and its former African colonies, 
and the next one of France and Spain together, and lastly Germany and its former colonies as well as 
the OECD Principles. Ghana and Nigeria, which are both former German and British colonies, have 
been placed next to Germany for two reasons, both because they were initially German colonies and 
because of practical table size reasons. The Spanish and French codes and their colonies are in the 
same table, as Morocco was partly under both of their colonial rule and therefore the comparison is 
easier to make when both of the European countries are in the same table. 
 
In the last part of the results, we describe the results from the Transparency International Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI). The main data for all countries is from the year 2014, but we shall also present 
the results of the CPI also from the year before the issuing of the code to analyse the possible effects 
of the governance code. The results of the CPI used are both the ranks of the country in the index as 
well as the scores received. The score indicates the perceived level of corruption and the scale ranges 
from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean). In previous years the CPI ranged from 0 to 10, and these 
results have been scaled to the same range by multiplying the result with 10. 
 
Now that data collection and methodology have been described, we will move on to the results.  
 49 
 
5 Results 
 
5.1 Origin of code 
 
Table 1 summarises the list of European colonizer countries and their African colonies, and it only 
includes those African countries (and hence their colonizers) which have currently a corporate 
governance code in place. African countries are listed in the table in their current official name rather 
than the names of the countries or areas at the time of the colonialism. The table also shows the major 
religions of the country as well as the legal system divided into common, civil, and religious law. 
 
Out of the total 49 African countries that were under European colonialism, 13 countries currently 
have a corporate governance code in place that meets the criteria used in this study. Although in 
Rossouw’s (2005) study also Tanzania and Zambia are mentioned as having a corporate governance 
code, neither of these codes could be found for our study. This means that still the majority of African 
countries have not issued a governance code thus far. Some countries have also issued industry 
specific codes directed at banks and financial institutions, such as Mauritius. Some of the African 
countries have issued revised and updates codes, and therefore the previous codes’ years of publish 
have been marked in brackets. 
 
Table 1 shows that the majority of the codes are from former British colonies, as eight of the countries 
or ten if you include Ghana and Nigeria, where under British rule during the colonial period. 
Therefore, only three countries, Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, of totally other origin have issued 
their own governance code. 
 
Of the 13 African countries in our sample, five are purely common law systems, one civil law system, 
and three are mix of the two systems. In addition to these basic legal systems, five of the countries 
are partly religion or more exactly sharia law based systems, as they are all Muslim countries. There 
is no major religion that would dominate in the sample, as there are equal amount of Protestant and 
Muslim countries, if we exclude the countries that are only categorised as Christian as there was no 
clear dominating group of Christianity in these countries. However, Catholic African countries are in 
a minority in the sample of countries that have a governance code. Median for the main mortality rate 
estimate (see Acemoglu et al. 2001) is 111,6 per 1000 and the mean mortality rate estimate is 354, 
47. The majority of the countries are from the Eastern region of Africa, but the Northern African 
countries are also significant group, while Southern and Western countries are in a minority, and there 
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are no countries from the Central region of Africa. 
 
 
Table 1 List of African codes, major religions and legal systems 
 
Table 2 describes those African countries which currently do not have a corporate governance code 
in place. Median of the mortality rate estimate of the countries without a corporate governance code 
is 400 per 1000, and the mean mortality rate estimate is 617 per mean strength per year. Therefore, 
the average mortality rate estimates for the settler in the countries, which currently do not have a 
corporate governance code in place are higher than in the countries that do have a corporate 
governance code in place. Although the sample of countries that do have a governance code also 
include Nigeria and Ghana with high mortality rates, overall the scores are significantly lower in the 
countries with the codes in general.  
 
Compared to the countries in Table 1, Table 2 consists of significantly more countries of French 
colonial heritage, meaning that significantly lower number of French colonies have started to make 
their own corporate governance codes when compared to the British colonies. Although France and 
Great Britain both had approximately the same number of colonies in Africa, only three of the French 
colonies now have a corporate governance code in place, while the equivalent number for Great 
Colonizer Colony Code Published Religion Legal system Mortality estimate Region
Great Britain Yes 2014 Protestant Common
Botswana Yes 2008 Protestant Civil/common Southern
Egypt Yes 2006 Muslim Religious/Civil 67,8 Northern
Ghana ** Yes 2010 (2000) Christian Common 668 Western
Kenya Yes 2002 Protestant Common 145 Eastern
Malawi Yes 2011 (2001) Catholic Common Eastern
Mauritius Yes 2012 (2003) Hindu Civil Eastern
Nigeria ** Yes 2011 (2003) Protestant/Muslim Common/Religious 2004 Western
South Africa Yes 2009 (2002, 1994) Protestant Civil/Common 15,5 Southern
Tanzania *** Yes * 2000 Christian Common 145 Eastern
Uganda Yes 2003 Catholic Common 280 Eastern
Zambia Yes * 2000 Christian Common Eastern
Zimbabwe Yes n.d. Protestant Civil/Common Eastern
Germany Yes 2014 Protestant Civil
Ghana Yes 2010 (2000) Christian Common 668 Western
Nigeria Yes 2011 (2003) Protestant/Muslim Common/Religious 2004 Western
France Yes 2011 Catholic Civil
Algeria Yes 2009 Muslim Civil/Religious 78,2 Northern
Morocco *** Yes 2008 Muslim Civil/Religious 78,2 Northern
Tunisia Yes 2008 Muslim Civil/Religious 63 Northern
Spain Yes 2015 (2006) Catholic Civil
Morocco*** Yes 2008 Muslim Civil/Religious 78,2 Northern
Total 13
Note: Mortality rate estimate per 1000 per mean strength per year
** Formerly German colonies
*** Divided between different colonizers
Source: The World FactBook, and Acemoglu et al. (2001)
* Code not found: These countries are mentioned in Rossouw's (2005) research to have a code
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Britain is ten as mentioned before. When comparing the mortality rates between each colonizer, the 
median mortality rate in French colonies is higher than in British colonies (280 and 212,5 
respectively), and the means are 517,59 and 536,65 respectively. Therefore, although the levels 
between these colonizers are not immensely different, it would seem that without the few exceptions, 
such as Nigeria and Mali, the mortality rate in French colonies is higher than in British colonies. 
 
Portugal, Belgium, Italy, and Russia are all colonizers which former colonies have not issued any 
corporate governance code thus far. The major similarity for these countries is the fact that many of 
them are of civil law origin, and many of them are either Muslim or Catholic countries. 
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Table 2 African countries without a corporate governance code 
Colonizer Colony Religion Legal system Mortality estimate Region
Great Britain Protestant Common
Gambia Muslim Common/Religious 1470 Western
Lesotho Christian Common Southern
Namibia * Christian Civil Southern
Sierra Leone Muslim Common 483 Western
Somalia * Muslim Civil/Religious Eastern
Sudan Muslim Civil/Religious 88,2 Northern
Swaziland Christian Civil/Common Southern
Germany Protestant Civil
Cameroon Christian Common/Civil 280 Central
Namibia* Christian Civil Southern
Burundi** Christian Civil Eastern
Rwanda** Christian Civil Eastern
Togo Christian/Folk Customary 668 Western
France Catholic Civil
Benin Christian/Muslim Civil Western
Burkina Faso Muslim Civil 280 Western
Central African 
Rebublic
Protestant Civil Central
Chad Muslim Civil Central
Comoros Muslim Civil/Religious Eastern
Gabon Christian Civil 280 Central
Guinea Muslim Civil 483 Western
Ivory Coast Christian/Muslim Civil 668 Western
Madagascar Christian/Folk Civil 536,04 Eastern
Mali Muslim Civil 2940 Western
Mauritania Muslim Civil/Religious Western
Niger Muslim Civil/Religious 400 Western
Rebublic of the 
Congo
Catholic/Folk Civil 240 Central
Senegal Muslim Civil 164,66 Western
Portugal Catholic Civil
Angola Catholic Civil 280 Central
Cape Verde 
Islands
Catholic Civil Western
Guinea-Bissau Muslim/Folk Civil Western
Mozambique Catholic Civil Eastern
Belgium Catholic Civil
Burundi ** Catholic Civil Eastern
Democratic 
Rebublic of the 
Congo
Catholic Civil Central
Rwanda ** Catholic Civil Eastern
Italy Catholic Civil
Eritrea Christian/Muslim Civil/Religious Eastern
Libya Muslim N/A Northern
Somalia * Muslim Civil/Religious Eastern
Spain Catholic Civil
Equatorial 
Guinea
Christian Civil Central
Russia Orthodox Civil
Djibouti Muslim Civil/Religious Eastern
Note: Mortality estimate per 1000 mean strength per year
* Divided between different colonizers
** German colonies lost after WW2
Source: The World FactBook, and Acemoglu et al. (2001)
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Table 3 summarises tables 1 and 2 by showing the number of colonies of each European colonizer, 
as well as dividing the total number into countries which do and do not have a corporate governance 
code in place, as well as the relation between the two. The numbers for United Kingdom and France 
have been calculated both with the number of divided colonies (Ghana, Morocco, and Nigeria) as 
well as without them, and therefore there are two ratios for both countries. The table shows that 
although United Kingdom and France have had approximately the same amount of colonies, the ratio 
for countries with code is significantly higher in United Kingdom than in France.  
 
 
 
Table 3 Relation of countries with and without a code divided between colonizers 
 
5.2 Board of Directors 
 
Table 4 describes the recommendations for board of directors in United Kingdom and its former 
colonies, expect Ghana and Nigeria which have been placed in table 6. Table 5 describes same 
recommendations for France, Spain and their colonies and table 6 describes recommendations aimed 
at boards in Germany and its colonies as well as the general OECD Principles for corporate 
governance. This same division and order of tables will be used in the following sections. 
 
In all of the codes, regardless of whether countries were colonizers or colonies themselves, the main 
roles and responsibilities of the board of directors is basically the same, as boards should offer 
leadership and decide on the strategy and mission of the company, as well as elect, supervise and 
compensate the management. Some of the codes list also more specific duties than others, for example 
Zimbabwe states that it is the responsibility of the board to ensure that the company is not build with 
unnecessary and over complex structures. All in all, all of the codes are very similar in this regard. 
 
All of the countries which are former British colonies recommend the unitary board structure, even 
Ghana and Nigeria which were first German colonies, whilst in Germany the dual board is mandated 
by the regulation. The French code states that both structures are acceptable while the Spanish code 
again recommends the unitary board. Only African countries which do not primarily recommend 
either structure are Algeria and Tunisia, which are both former French colonies, while Morocco 
United Kingdom France Germany Spain Italy Russia Portugal Belgium
Nr. of colonies
Code  8 / 10  2 / 3 2 1 0 0 0 0
No code 7 14 5 1 3 1 4 3
Total 15 / 17 16 / 17 7 2 3 1 4 3
Relation 0,53 / 0,59 ; 0,47 / 0,41 0,13 / 0,18 ; 0,88 / 0,82 0,29 ; 0,71 0,5 ; 0,5 0 ; 1 0 ; 1 0 ; 1 0 ; 1
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mentions that both structures are acceptable but the unitary board is preferable. Therefore, it seems 
that British and most of French colonies have mimicked their colonizers’ recommendation on the 
board structure, while former German colonies have not followed Germanic governance in this 
regard, but have rather followed their other colonizer Great Britain. 
 
The diversity and balance of the board is a more diverse topic in the codes. The UK code only states 
that there should be balance between executives, non-executives and independent directors, and some 
of its former colonies, such as Botswana, and Kenya, have adopted the same basic recommendations. 
However, other countries, such as Malawi and Uganda, have recommended a much wider diversity 
in relation to especially gender or social and economic background. It is notable that South Africa 
does not mention any diversity requirements in King Report III, although it is considered the 
forerunner in African economy. The French and Spanish codes both recommend a wider diversity for 
the board, as they recommend diversity in gender, knowledge and expertise as well as background 
and nationality (French).  Their former colonies also recommend wider diversity, and Morocco and 
Tunisia even recommend age diversity. Also notable is that Morocco, whilst being a highly Muslim 
country, recommends gender diversity on boards.  Again Ghana and Nigeria are not following directly 
German route, which requires employee representation on boards. Ghana has again followed UK 
code’s recommendations of balance between executives and non-executives, while Nigeria has the 
most profound requirements for diversity on boards, with gender, age and range diversity, as well as 
limitations on the amount of family-members on boards. Therefore, Nigeria does not seem to follow 
either of its former colonizers, but has rather developed its own recommendations. 
 
Not many codes specifically recommend a particular size for the boards, and many of the specific 
size recommendations are in fact from the countries’ legislation rather than from governance codes. 
UK and German codes only recommend that boards should be of sufficient size to have enough 
expertise on the board but at the same time not so large as to be unwieldy, and Uganda has opted for 
the same recommendation while many former British colonies do not address the issue at all. Of the 
British and German colonies, Egyptian and South African laws state the minimum number. Only 
Malawi and Ghana of African countries recommend a specific range in their codes, and Spain makes 
an exception also by recommending a clear size between five and fifteen in its code. Again in the case 
of France and its colonies, the instructions for the board size come from legislation, with colonies 
recommending sizes between three and twelve. Therefore, there is no clear pattern between European 
and African countries when it comes to board size, but African countries in general do seem to 
encourage smaller boards rather than larger boards, as the maximum size mentioned in the African 
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codes is 16 (Ghana). This is smaller than, for example, in the French legislation, which has stated that 
the maximum is board size 18 directors. 
 
Amount of non-executive and independent directors do not seem to follow any clear pattern either. 
While the UK code only has a recommendation considering the amount of independent directors, 
many of the African countries have recommendations for both non-executives and independent 
directors’ amounts, or only for non-executives’ amounts. Kenya seems to have the most insufficient 
recommendations, as it only recommends 1/3 of the board to be non-directors and makes no mention 
of the number independent directors, while South Africa has the highest quality recommendations in 
the African sample. It is notable that both of these are former British colonies, so there is no clear 
pattern between colonies and colonizers in this issue. In addition, nearly all of the countries have 
identified what makes a director to be independent, with exceptions of Algeria, Zimbabwe and 
Morocco (as non-executive director is not necessarily the same thing as independent). The criteria for 
independent director is similar in many countries, regardless of whether the countries are European 
or African. Therefore, the African code criteria is not significantly lower or broader compared to the 
more developed markets with larger labour markets. Separation of the positions of CEO and chairman 
of the board is very consistent throughout the sample regardless of the colonial heritage, as nearly all 
of the European and African countries recommend or demand the separation of the positions. One 
major exception is Spain, which states that it takes no position on the matter, and thus does not 
recommend for the positions to be separated. Also, Algeria does not clearly recommend either 
separating or combining the positions, but the legislation does not demand for the separation. 
 
Multiple directorship limitation recommendations do not seem to follow any specific pattern either, 
as for example France and Germany both limit the number of directorships to two and three 
respectively, while their former colonies allow much more directorships or do not limit them at all. 
While the UK code does not limit the number of directorships, many of its former colonies do list 
specific limitations, which are also relatively high (for example in Kenya maximum of 10, Tunisia of 
5, and Morocco of 8 directorships). Therefore, the codes generally seem to allow more directorships 
in Africa than in Europe, when such recommendations are given. 
 
In the case of board committees, all countries except Algeria recommend or require the appointment 
of audit committee, and nearly all of them require at least some of the members to be independent. 
Egyptian code also states that if there is not enough non-executive directors to be found inside the 
board for the committee to be independent, then outside members may be appointed. However, it has 
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to be noted that in the professional criteria of audit committee members, some countries do not require 
as much expertise from its members, as for example the Nigerian or Malawian codes require members 
to be financially literate and have basic knowledge of accounting, while for example Egypt requires 
at least one member to be a professional in the areas of finance and accounting. In addition to audit 
committee, many countries, both African and European, recommend the appointment of remuneration 
or remuneration and nomination committee. In addition to these regular committees, Mauritius, 
Nigeria, and South Africa recommend the appointment of a risk management committee, while 
Mauritius and Spain recommend a specialised corporate governance committee. 
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Table 4 Board of directors: UK and its colonies  
United Kingdom Botswana Egypt Kenya Malawi Mauritius South Africa Uganda Zimbabwe
Board structure Unitary board Unitary board Unitary board Unitary board Unitary board. Unitary board Unitary board Unitary board Unitary board
Diversity Balance of executives, non-
executives and independent 
members
Balance of executive and 
non-executive directors
Proportionally represents 
shareholders according to 
capital distribution. He/she
Balance of executive and 
non-executive (including 
independent) directors
Balanced mix of experience 
and skills, diversity of 
gender, social and economic 
background
Knowledge, skill, 
experience and 
objectivity, he/she
N/A, He/she Gender N/A
Size Sufficient size, not so large 
to be unwieldy
N/A N/A, law min 3 members * N/A 6-12 in listed companies Smaller boards 
encouraged
Min 3 members in 
listed companies *
Not too small or large N/A
Independence 
criteria
Not a significant shareholder 
or employee, holder of cross-
directorships or family ties, 
or a member of board for 
more than 9 years
Not an employee, 
professional adviser, 
family member, significant 
customer, supplier or 
shareholder
Not a family-member, 
major shareholder, 
employee, or representative 
of companies with 
significant dealings with the 
company *
Independent from 
management and free from 
business or other 
relationship
Not an employee, 
consultant, immediate 
family-member, customer, 
supplier or shareholder
Not a family-member 
of significant 
shareholder, employee, 
professional adviser, 
significant supplier, 
creditor or partner
Absense of undue 
influence and bias
Not an employee, 
adviser, significant 
customer or supplier, no 
personal service 
contract, a member of 
immediate family
N/A
Audit committee Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes, in listed companies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Composition of 
audit committee
At least three, or in small 
companies two, independent 
directors
All non-executives and 
majority of them 
independent
At least three non-executive 
directors, or from outside 
the company if necessary
Independent non-
executive directors
Non-executive directors Non-executives, 
majority independent 
Majority of non-
executive directors, 
majority of whom 
independent
Majority of independent 
or non-executive 
directors
Independent non-
executive directors
Audit committee 
professional 
criteria
At least one member has 
recent and relevant financial 
experience
N/A One should be a financial 
and accounting expert
N/A Financially literate N/A Collectively 
sufficiently qualified 
and experienced
Broad business 
knowledge, familiarity 
with basic accounting 
principles.
Suitably skilled and 
experienced
Other committees Remuneration Remuneration, nomination Remuneration Remuneration, nomination Nomination and other 
needed committees
Corporate governance, 
nomination, risk
Remuneration, 
nomination, risk
Remuneration, 
nomination
N/A
N/A
Majority Majority in listed 
companies
N/A
SeparatedSeparated Preferably separated Preferably separated
N/A Disclosed Max 3 for listed companies 
*
Executives: max 2 non-
executive posts, non-
executives: max 10
N/A
Separation of 
CEO and 
Chairman
Preferably separated Preferably separated
Amount of non-
executive directors
Amount of 
independent 
directors
N/A Minimum 1/3 Minimum 1/3
Multiple 
directorships
Majority Majority of non-executive 
directors
N/A
Role Ethical leadership, 
strategy, promote 
stakeholder-inclusive 
approach, ensure that 
values are adhered to, 
IT governance, hiring 
and supervision of 
management
Leadership and control 
over the company, 
strategy, compliance 
with laws
Long-term success, 
leadership, strategy, review 
management performance, 
and ensure necessary 
resources, dialogue with 
shareholders
Lead and control the 
company, ensure 
compliance with legal and 
ethical standards, and 
ensure competent 
management of company
Strategic guidance, 
leadership and control, 
remuneration of 
executives, ensuring 
shareholder 
communication policy
Ensure company 
survival, monitor 
relationship between 
management and 
stakeholders, provide 
ethical leadership, 
ensure ethical corporate 
citizenship
CEO and chairman 
appointment, supervision, 
risk management
Leadership, determine 
purpose, values and 
strategy
Ensure that complies with 
legislation, exercise 
leadership , determine 
mission, vision and values 
and ensure that dialogue 
exists between owners and 
board
Max 7N/A
Preferably separated
See below
Independent and non-
executive directors 
together minimum 1/3
Majority
N/A
Preferably separated
Max 5 in listed 
companies, max 2 
chairmanships
Preferably separated
N/A
Majority
At least 1 in listed 
companies
At least two Majority of non-
executive directors
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Table 5 Board of directors: France and Spain and their colonies 
France Algeria Tunisia Morocco Spain
Role Supervision of management, ensure high 
standard information disclosure, strategy
Strategy, hiring of executives, 
remuneration of executive team and 
board members themselves
Compliance with law, strategy, hiring of 
managers, assuring the quality of 
financial information
Strategy, supervision of management, 
ensuring the observance of laws, 
improving corporate govenrance
Staregy, control of management, avoid 
artificial and overly complex structures 
or tax havens
Structure Unitary or dual board Unitary or dual board * Unitary or dual board Primarily unitary board Unitary board
Diversity Educational background, nationality, 
gender
Experience and competence, 
executives and non executives
Age (1/3 < 40 and 1/3 > 60), experience, 
profile and expertise
Training, professional experience, male-
female balance, age, nationality
Knowledge, gender (at least 30% 
women) and experience
Size Max 18 * Min 3 max 12 * Min 3 max 12 * N/A Min 5 max 15
Amount of non-
executive directors
N/A Particularly SMEs should have N/A Majority Large majority
Amount of 
independent directors
Minimum 1/3 N/A Minimum 1/3 N/A At least half, in smaller companies 1/3
Independence criteria Not an employee, employee of 
significant financial partner, auditor, or 
board member more than 12 years
N/A Not an employee or relative, no ties with 
significant financial partner, no other 
remuneration
Non-executives or outside members Not a past employee, partner, cross-
director, significant business partner, 
shareholder, family-member
Separation of CEO 
and Chairman
Either by dual structure or separation of 
positions
No * Preferably separated Either by dual structure or separation of 
positions
No position
Multiple directorships Max 2 executive directorships Max 5 * Max 8 * Avoid holding several directorships N/A
Audit committee Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes
Composition of audit 
committee
At least 1/3 independent, managers and 
employees may not be members
N/A At lest one independent member Majority of non executive or outside 
members
Majority of independent directors
Professional criteria 
of audit committee 
members
N/A N/A N/A All members should have solid knowledge 
of accounting and financial details
All members should have knowledge 
and background in accounting, auditing 
and risk management
Other committees Remuneration, nomination Remuneration,nomination and other 
needed committees
Remuneration, nomination, strategy Nomination and remuneration Remuneration, nomination, governance, 
executive and supervisory
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Table 6 Board of directors: Germany and its colonies and OECD Principles
Germany Ghana Nigeria OECD
Structure Dual board Unitary board Unitary board Unitary or dual board
Independence criteria No personal or business relations with company, 
executives, controlling shareholder
Not a substantial shareholder, employee, 
professional adviser, supplier, customer and 
free from relationships with corporate body
Not a substantial shareholder, representative of a 
significant shareholder, employee, family-member, 
adviser, supplier or partner of audit firm
Not an employee, or closely related to the 
company through economic, family or other ties
Audit committee Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other committees Nomination Remuneration Remuneration, risk management Nomination, remuneration, ethics
Separated
Skills and experience, age, range and gender 
diversity, with upright personal characteristics, 
competencies, entrepreneurial spirit and a record of 
tangiable achievement, max. two family-members
Between 8 and 16 Minimum 5
Amount of independent 
directors
Amount of non-executive 
directors
At least one member has to have expertise 
knowledge of accounting and annual auditing *
Employees represented in SBs  MB: aim for 
appropriate consideration of women
N/A
Adequate financial, accounting and juristic 
knowledge
Professional criteria of audit 
committee members
At least one independent member *
At least one board member should be financially 
literate and have knowledge of accounting
N/A
N/A
No limitationsMB: max 3 SB directorshipsMultiple directorships No limitations, not members of boards of 
companies in the same industry
Disclosure
Role
N/A
No position
Management board (MB): management and 
providing information to SB. Supervisory board 
(SB): appointment, supervision and advising 
members of management board
MB: several persons  SB: sufficient amount
At least 1/3, minimum two in any eventSB: Adequate number At least one
Sufficient numberSB: No more than two former members of MB Majority N/A
Sufficient number
Strategy, risk, monitor management and 
governance, align intersts of shareholders and 
executives, monitor conflicts of interest, 
communication
Strategy, compensating and monitoring 
executives, ensuring compliance with law and 
integrity of reporting systems
Affairs of the company, strategy, supervision of 
management, risk management, communication, 
ensuring that ethical standards are maintained
Preferably separated
Size
Composition of audit committee At least 3 directors, majority non-executive
Balance of executives and non-executives, "he"
Separation of CEO and 
Chairman
Diversity
Separated by the dual structure Preferably separated
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5.3 Remuneration 
 
 
Tables 7, 8, and 9 show the results of the remuneration recommendations of executive and non-
executive directors in each country and the OECD Principles. 
 
All of the countries in the sample recommend executive directors payments to be linked to 
performance at least to some extent, with some countries recommending specifically individual 
performance related elements. This is another one of the main similarities between the countries of 
our study. However, the differences come in whether non-executive directors should be allowed to 
have performance related elements in their payment schemes: UK and Spain would not allow non-
executive directors remuneration to be linked to performance, while Germany and France would. The 
African countries that explicitly would not allow performance related payments for non-executives 
are of either British or German/British origin, and these are Mauritius, South Africa, Egypt, Nigeria, 
and Ghana. As only three countries explicitly state that the non-executive directors’ remuneration 
should somehow be linked to performance, and many countries leave this issue unaddressed, it can 
be said that the majority of the recommendations are therefore aiming that non-executive 
remuneration should not be variable. It should also be remarked that Malawi is the only code that 
states that non-executives could possibly work pro-bono for the companies. 
 
There is also some variation in the decider of the remuneration policies. Mostly it is the board of 
directors that decides on the remuneration of the executives. However, the say on pay policy, which 
will be addressed also in the next section with shareholder rights, is recommended in some of the 
African countries as well as in Europe. It is also notable that in Egypt and Spain the remuneration of 
executives should be decided with negotiations with the CEO and directors, even though there should 
be an independent remuneration committee.  However, mainly the governance codes, regardless of 
the origin, recommend that individuals should not decide on their own remuneration and therefore 
recommend self-exclusion. In this regard, Spain and Egypt are very different to the rest of the sample. 
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Table 7 Remuneration: UK and its colonies 
 
Table 8 Remuneration: France, Spain and their colonies 
United Kingdom Botswana Egypt Kenya Malawi Mauritius South Africa Uganda Zimbabwe
Executive 
directors
Performance-related, with ability to 
reduce, withhold and recover 
payments and balanced with fixed 
payments
Performance related, should 
include bonus payment and 
share option schemes, but no 
discounts to employee share 
options
Performance related 
payments should form the 
largest portion, and be 
related to medium and 
long-term success
Corporate and individual 
performance related
Linked to long-time 
sustainability
Basic salary, share 
options, severance 
pay and bonuses
Linked to 
individual 
performance
Performance 
related
Fair and 
responsible 
compensation, 
aligned with risk 
taking and 
symmetric with 
risk outcomes
Decider Remuneration committee, long-term 
option schemes by shareholders
Board Committee, but 
negotiation with directors 
and CEO
Board Board, shareholders' 
approval in listed companies
Remuneration 
committee
Board and 
shareholders 
advisory vote
Board Board, 
shareholders' 
approval
Non-executive 
directors
Should not include performance 
related elements
Should include bonus 
payment and share option 
schemes
Preferably fixed and same 
for all
N/A Reflect time invested, 
commitment, performance 
and responsibilities, possibly 
pro-bono
Attendance fee Base and 
attendance fee
N/A Fair and 
responsible 
compensation
Benchmarking Should be judged relative to other 
companies, but with caution to avoid 
ratcheting and paying more than 
necessary, should not be excessive and 
be especially sensitive in relation to 
other employees
N/A Sufficient to attract and 
retain quality and calibre 
of needed individuals
Sufficient to attract and 
retain quality and calibre of 
directors needed
N/A N/A Disclosure of use 
of benchmarks
N/A N/A
France Algeria Tunisia Morocco Spain
Executive 
directors
Linked to medium and long-term 
performance, consistent with average 
employee compensation
Long-term, generally the same 
basic remuneration for all, plus 
performance related, dividends 
etc
Balance of short-term and long-term 
incentives, based on company and 
individual performance and objectives
Performance related, exhaustive, 
consistent and simple, sitting 
allowances
Performance related elements, with non-
financial criteria, include possibility to 
recover sums paid, large amount deferred 
for a long time to ensure true 
performance
Decider Board or supervisory board Board Board, managers should not be 
present in discussions regarding their 
compensation
Board Board, shareholders' advisory vote, 
committee should negotiate with CEO
Non-executive Variable compensation allowed, with 
particular attention to them
Long-term, generally the same 
basic remuneration for all
N/A Sitting allowances, variable 
portion possible
No company or individual performance-
related elements
Benchmarking Standards and practices prevailing in 
the location country, sector etc, but 
better to avoid bidding wars
Sufficiently raised to attract, 
retain and motivate managers
Motivate, hire and keep the most 
qualified and experimented staff, level 
within industry and other managers
Consistent with market practices Sufficient to attract and retain right 
people
Upper limit Yes, on severance pay: not exceed 
twice the fixed and variable annual 
pay (exc. options)
N/A N/A N/A Yes, on severance pay: not exceed twice 
the fixed and variable annual pay (exc. 
options)
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Table 9 Remuneration: Germany and its colonies and OECD Principles 
 
Major difference between compensation policies between African countries and European colonizers is the comparison and benchmarking 
recommendations of compensation policies. Some of European countries are now encouraging companies not to place too much emphasis on comparing 
their remuneration policies against other companies. For example, France clearly recommends companies to avoid bidding wars that would result from 
too much emphasis on comparisons, and the UK code advices to avoid ratcheting while still judging against other companies’ remuneration. However, 
Germany and Spain still recommend benchmarking without mentioning problems of ratcheting for example, as Spain for example has removed their 
previous code’s (2006) recommendation of not using the average remuneration of peer companies as a benchmark from their newer code. African 
countries either leave these issue unaddressed or state that remuneration policies and compensation levels should be on such a level that they would 
attract and retain managers. Nigeria for example recommends a periodical “peer review” for remuneration levels, and Ghana, Tunisia and Morocco 
encourage to take into account the industry practices and remuneration levels. The countries that do not address the issue are all former British colonies. 
None of the countries, even the newer codes of Nigeria or South Africa, have not recommended to abstain or cut down from over competing in 
management compensation levels. All of the European countries have recommended that some sort of upper limit should be set on remuneration, with 
France and Spain having clear upper limits only for severance payments, while nearly none of the African countries have recommended anything of the 
sort, except for Nigeria which has recommended a limit to be set on yearly share options of directors. 
Germany Ghana Nigeria OECD
Executive 
directors
Fixed as well as personal and 
company performance related, taking 
into consideration payments by group 
companies
Reflect experience and responsibility, 
linked as far as possible to corporate and 
individual performance
Component related to long-term performance, 
may include options and bonuses
Long-term
Decider Supervisory Board or shareholders Board on committee proposal Non-executive directors N/A
Non-executive Performance-related allowed Fixed Fixed sitting allowances or director's fees Long-term
Benchmarking Compensation level should take into 
account peer companies and other 
staff
Competitive taking into account industry 
practices, focus on pertaining 
management
Sufficient to attract, motivate and retain 
skilled persons, periodic "peer review" to 
ensure competitive remuneration
N/A
Upper limit Yes, both overall and individual N/A Yes, for share options N/A
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5.4 Shareholder rights 
 
Tables 10, 11, and 12 describe the shareholder rights and recommendations relating to them in each 
country and the OECD Principles. 
 
There is no clear pattern in how the one-share-one-vote practice is recommended in the codes. 
Although the one-share-one-vote practice may be allowed in the legislation of many countries, such 
as United Kingdom, Spain, or many African countries, the clear recommendations for it is absent in 
the codes. However, Germany and France explicitly state to be in favour of it, and for example France 
states that it is against limitations on voting rights, preferred shares and other special share categories. 
Also some former British colonies (Egypt and Kenya) as well as former French colonies Algeria, 
Tunisia and Morocco clearly recommend it. All in all numerous codes tend to support the principle 
in general, but still allow flexibility on the issue, by stating that all shareholders of the same class 
should be treated equally. It is notable that the Nigerian legislation requires all voting at general 
meetings to be decided on a show of hands, meaning essentially a one-shareholder-one-vote practice, 
while the UK code allows it too. 
 
Many of the countries address explicitly that the shareholders should have possibility to vote 
separately on each resolution rather than voting on bundled resolutions, but there is variation in every 
colonial division. Proxy and voting by mail seem to be becoming the norm in all countries, but the 
right to propose resolutions and put issues on the agenda of the general meeting is more varied. Again 
this issue seems to be mostly embedded in the legislation rather than in the codes, with variation in 
the share capital requirements. Malawi, Zimbabwe, and to some extent Botswana are exceptional in 
this section as they do not really address the issues related to shareholder rights in their codes. 
However, countries such as Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia seem to recommend many of the specific 
issues we have selected for this section, and Egypt is the only country that especially recommends 
cumulative voting in election of directors. 
 
Anti-takeover measures and market for corporate control are not addressed in the African codes with 
the exception of Kenya and Ghana. Therefore, clear majority of the countries in Africa do not mention 
external governance mechanisms directly. Also only France and Spain clearly state that they are 
against anti-takeover mechanisms. However, for example United Kingdom, which is the best example 
of an Anglo-Saxon country in our sample, does not mention them either anymore in its code.
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Table 10 Shareholder rights: UK and its colonies 
 
Table 11 Shareholder rights: France, Spain and their colonies  
United Kingdom Botswana Egypt Kenya Malawi Mauritius South Africa Uganda Zimbabwe
One share one vote N/A N/A Yes * Yes N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Proxy voting Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes * Yes Yes *
Voting by mail Yes N/A Yes, with electronic Yes N/A N/A Yes * Yes N/A
Put issues on agenda 
/propose resolutions
N/A N/A Yes, with 5 % share 
capital
Yes N/A Yes, with limitations Yes * Yes N/A
Cumulative voting N/A N/A Yes N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Separate resolutions Yes Yes Yes * N/A N/A Board appointment N/A N/A N/A
Say on pay Yes, advisory vote N/A No * N/A Yes, listed 
companies
Yes, on discounted 
share options
Yes, advisory vote N/A Yes
Anti-takeover measures N/A N/A N/A Should not be used N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Other One shareholder one 
vote allowed
Board makes sure 
that market for 
corporate control 
is efficient
Encouragement of 
institutional investor 
participation
Encouragement of 
institutional 
investor 
participation
France Algeria Tunisia Morocco Spain
One share one vote Yes Yes * Yes Yes N/A
Proxy voting Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Voting by mail Yes and electronic voting No Yes Yes Yes
Put issues on agenda Yes, with 5 % share capital Yes Yes, with 2,5 % share capital * Yes, with 5 % share capital * Yes, with 3 % share capital 
*Cumulative voting N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Separate resolutions Yes No * No * Yes * Yes
Say on pay Calls for regulatory change 
for SoP to be allowed
No No Partly, only for total 
compensation of the board *
Yes, advisory vote
Anti-takeover measures Should be avoided N/A N/A N/A Should be avoided
Other AFG against preferred shares, 
limitations on voting rights 
etc
Website Active market for 
corporate control 
encouraged
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Table 12 Shareholder rights: Germany and its colonies and OECD Principles 
 
The shareholders’ right to vote on the remuneration of executives (not non-executive directors), or say on pay, is advised at least to some extent in all of 
the European countries in this sample, either as an advisory or binding vote. Only four African countries have recommended the say on pay policy: 
Malawi, Mauritius (partly), South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Morocco call for shareholder approval on the total compensation of the board. Therefore, the 
countries recommending the say on pay policy are former British colonies, with the exception of Morocco, and they are in a clear minority in the sample. 
African countries such as Mauritius, Uganda, Ghana, and Nigeria especially encourage and recommend especially institutional investors to engage in 
company actions and Ghana even explicitly states that they should be encouraged to do this due to “lack of sophistication of domestic individual 
investors”. However, these countries are in a minority, as many of the African countries do not mention institutional investors at all in their codes.
Germany Ghana Nigeria OECD
One share one vote Yes Yes, unless otherwise specified No, one shareholder-one vote * No position
Proxy voting Yes Yes Yes * Yes
Voting by mail Yes Yes N/A Yes
Put issues on agenda Yes Yes, with reasonable limitations N/A Yes
Cumulative voting N/A N/A N/A No position
Separate resolutions N/A Yes Yes N/A
Say on pay Possibility * No No Yes, on equity based 
compensationAnti-takeover measures N/A N/A N/A Should not be used
Institutional investors are 
encouraged to influence and 
demand compliance with 
governance codes
Other Institutional investors are encouraged 
to influence due to lack of 
sophistication of domestic individual 
investors, ensure functioning market 
for corporate control
Markets for corporate control 
should be allowed to function 
in an efficient manner
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5.5 Other stakeholder inclusion 
 
Tables 13, 14, and 15 show the results of other stakeholder inclusion in the governance codes in each 
country and the OECD Principles. 
 
The codes of United Kingdom or France do not particularly mention other stakeholders or their 
inclusion in their codes. These codes do not mention clearly any stakeholder groups, other than 
shareholders, and their stakeholder policies are not specific. However, Spain and Germany mention 
employees and customers as stakeholders, but none of the European countries mention environment 
or society as a whole as major stakeholders. Only African countries that do not specifically mention 
different stakeholders are Botswana, Uganda, and Ghana, which all have British colonial heritage at 
least partly. Most African countries, regardless of the colonizer, define environment, society, 
customers and suppliers as stakeholders, and Algeria and Nigeria mention state explicitly as a major 
stakeholder or promotion of national interests as a major policy. 
 
Malawi and South Africa are the countries that specifically mention ubuntu or umunthu, while other 
African countries explain the same concept at least partly through other means. For example, many 
African countries mention society or host communities as major stakeholders, or by stating the 
stakeholder rights have to be taken into account in decision making and promote different 
stakeholders interests. The furthest in their codes in expressing stakeholder and societal issues go 
Nigeria and Tunisia, which mention issues such as human rights, child labour, or AIDS and malaria, 
and even linguistic heritage in their codes as issues that should be acknowledged in business. 
Therefore, the inclusive model of corporate governance has been incorporate into the codes in nearly 
all African countries. Of African countries Botswana and Uganda have the least amount of 
recommendations regarding stakeholders and sustainability, and they do not specifically address any 
issues related to sustainability which would need special attention. It is notable that these are both 
former British colonies, as United Kingdom has not made any real recommendations related to 
sustainability issues either. Spain has the most comprehensive recommendations relating to 
stakeholder and sustainability issues of the European countries, while United Kingdom seems to have 
the least demanding and explicit recommendations for such issues. 
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Table 13 Other stakeholder inclusion: UK and its colonies 
 
 
 
Table 14 Other stakeholder inclusion: France, Spain and their colonies 
 
United Kingdom Botswana Egypt Kenya Malawi Mauritius South Africa Uganda Zimbabwe
Stakeholders 
mentioned
N/A N/A Customers, employees, 
environment, suppliers, 
community
Employees, environment, 
gender, children, host 
communities
Environment and society as 
a whole
Environment, 
employees, customers, 
suppliers
Environment, society N/A Society and 
environment
Stakeholder 
policy
Special attention to 
social and 
environmental factors, 
give them the same 
level of consideration
Obligations to all 
shareholders and other 
stakeholders
Optimum balance between 
shareholders and 
stakeholders.
Rights of stakeholders 
(whether established by 
law or
custom) are protected
Board should take into 
consideration wider societal 
interests, allow African 
umunthu values to thrive 
within the ethical framework
Account the 
expectations of 
shareholders for 
reasonable capital 
growth and 
responsibility towards 
other stakeholders
Appropriate balance 
between various 
stakeholders, not 
compromising the 
natural environment, 
ubuntu
Take into 
consideration the 
stakeholders in 
decision making
Appropriate balance 
between needs of 
different 
stakeholders
Sustainability N/A N/A At least annual disclosure 
of environmental, social, 
safety and heatlh policies 
to shareholders, customers 
and employees, including  
recruitment, training and 
social welfare programmes
Policy for creating wealth, 
jobs and sustainability
in a financially sound 
corporation, while 
meeting environmental 
and societal needs
Conduct operations in a 
manner that meets existing 
needs without 
compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet 
their needs, sustainability 
includes supply chain
Company should act 
responsibly towards 
stakeholders, at least 
annual integrated 
sustainability reporting 
on environment, health 
and safety, and social 
issues
Consider impacts on 
economy, society and 
environment, and invest 
in wellbeing of economy, 
society and environment, 
with measurable 
corporate citizenship 
programmes
N/A Appreciate that 
strategy, risk, 
performance and 
sustainability are 
inseparable
France Algeria Tunisia Morocco Spain
Stakeholder 
policy
Boards are encouraged to pay 
specific attention to 
environmental and social issues
Respect of the law especially in 
labour and tax legislation and 
environmental protection 
Balance: take into account the 
interests of all stakeholders, fight 
against any discrimination, child 
labour, respect human rights and 
encourage employment of disabled
Genuine mutual interests to 
stakeholders (people), take every 
possible step to treat them equally, 
implementation of employee 
participation practices
Concrete practices in matters 
relating to stakeholders and the 
environment, diversity, fiscal 
responsibility, respect for human 
rights and the prevention of illegal 
conductsSustainability Strategy and actions 
recommendedly in line with 
sustainable development of the 
company
Sustainable collaboration with 
supplier and banks, and ethical 
behaviour towards competitors, 
and take into consideration its 
human capital
Strategy should target profitability 
and performance regarding economic, 
social and environmental issues, take 
part in preserving cultural, historical, 
linguistic and artistic heritage
Communicate whatever company 
can about its social, environmental 
and its ethical rules, especially 
human resource policy
Deploy an appropriate corporate 
social responsibility policy, and 
report transparently and in 
sufficient detail with 
internationally accepted 
methodology
Stakeholders 
mentioned
Employees, suppliers, creditors, 
customers
N/A State, financial institutions, 
supplier, customers, employees
Employees, customers and 
environment
Employees, customers, creditors, 
administration
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Table 15 Other stakeholder inclusion: Germany and its colonies and OECD Principles 
 
Germany Ghana Nigeria OECD
Stakeholders 
mentioned
Customers, employees, public N/A Employees, host community, 
customers, public
Employees, creditors, customers, 
suppliers, local communities, 
environment
Stakeholder 
policy
Managing taking into account 
shareholders, employees and 
other stakeholders
Interests of others are relevant as a 
derivative of the duty to shareholders, 
not aimed at benefiting stakeholders 
at the expense of shareholders
Adequate attention to the interest of 
stakeholders, sensitivity to social and 
cultural diversity, and promote as 
much as possible the national 
interests, ethos and values, accidents, 
fatalities, strategy on addressing 
AIDS/malaria, employment and 
gender equity and social investments
Board should apply high ethical 
standards and take into account the 
interests of stakeholders, and rights 
that are established by law are to be 
respected
Sustainability Objective of sustainable value Encouraged disclosure on e.g. 
employment, environmental matters, 
social responsibility, and matters of 
customer and supplier interest
Extent of social, ethi al, safety, health 
and environmental policies
N/A
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5.6 Disclosure 
 
Tables 16, 17, and 18 show the results of information disclosure and transparency policy 
recommendations and the OECD Principles. 
 
The UK code states that companies should disclose a fair, balanced and understandable assessment 
that extends also to the interim and price-sensitive information. Almost these exact same wordings 
and requirements can be found in the codes of Botswana and Kenya. However, mostly the 
recommendations of the former British colonies are not similar, as some former British colonies have 
made their own recommendations to extend to for example integrated sustainability reporting 
(Malawi, Mauritius, South Africa, and Zimbabwe), and Malawian code also recommends companies 
to disclose reasons for decisions that may appear compromised due to conflict of interest. Also the 
regularity of information disclosure is not uniform either, as for example the code of Mauritius only 
recommends annual disclosure, Kenyan code a half-year disclosure and Ugandan code quarterly 
results to shareholders. However, for example Nigerian code recommends and encourages companies 
to disclose any unethical or illegal actions that might occur, and some countries, such as South Africa, 
Zimbabwe, and Mauritius, recommend sustainability reporting to be integrated with the basic 
financial reporting. European countries, such as United Kingdom and France make no 
recommendations of this kind on sustainability issues. Therefore, some African countries have clearly 
and explicitly encouraged wider and more profound information disclosure than their colonizers have 
in the corporate governance code, although similar disclosure requirements might be included in GRI 
reporting or other reporting initiatives. 
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Table 16 Disclosure: UK and its colonies 
 
Table 17 Disclosure: France, Spain and their colonies 
 
 
Table 18 Disclosure: Germany and its colonies and OECD Principles 
 
 
United Kingdom Botswana Egypt Kenya Malawi Mauritius South Africa Uganda Zimbabwe
Information Fair, balanced and 
understandable assessment 
extends also to interim and 
price-sensitive information
Balanced and 
understandable assessment 
extends to interim and other 
price-sensitive public 
reports
Overview of operations and 
financial status, affiliates' 
activities, capital changes, 
vision and compliance with 
Corporate Governance 
Principles in annual report
Balanced and 
understandable assessment 
of the company's position 
at least annually and 
preferably every six months
Integrated sustainability 
reporting, consider making 
regular, accurate and truthful 
reporting and disclosure of 
reasons for making decisions 
which may appear 
compromised due to conflict 
of interest
Annual financial 
reporting, corporate 
governance report and 
integrated 
sustainability 
reporting
Complete, timely, 
relevant, accurate, honest 
and accessible information, 
whilst having regard to 
legal and strategic 
considerations. Integrated 
sustainability reporting 
with financial reporting
Regular investor 
briefings, with annual, 
half-yearly and 
quarterly results
Timely and accurate 
disclosure is made on all 
material matters, including  
financial situation, 
performance, ownership, 
and governance, integrated 
and independently assured 
sustainability reporting
France Algeria Tunisia Morocco Spain
Information Summary and full financial reports Annual disclosure of financial state, 
as well as voluntary or contract 
based information for suppliers, 
customers, employees, associates 
and financial institutions. Clear 
decision on which information is 
public and which is to be conceiled
Shareholdings and existing agreements 
with shareholders, board, and 
managers, define accounting choises 
that meet as much as possible the 
assigned qualitative characteristics
Legal or moral obligation to report 
especially issues that call into question the 
equitable treatment of shareholders, 
especially financial information has to be in 
strict compliance with international 
standards and possibly scores of 
international financial rating agencies, CG, 
management, internal control reports
Annual publishing of corporate 
governance report, disclosure on 
mechanisms to resolve conflicts of 
interest and related-party 
transactions
Germany Ghana Nigeria OECD
Information Annual Corporate Governance 
Report, Group management report, 
Financial statements, with 
information on stock option 
programmes, third party companies 
and related party shareholders
Any deviations from accounting 
standards should be disclosed. 
Financial, ownership, governance, 
business ethics, environment 
information
Increased disclosure beyond the 
statutory requirements, reports on 
governance, code of conduct and 
ethics, sustainability and human 
resource policies, and related party 
transactions. Reporting of 
unethical/unlawful activities is 
encouraged
Financial and operational results according 
to high quality standards, objectives, major 
share ownership and voting rights 
(pyramids etc), remuneration policy, 
related party transactions, risks, employee 
and stakeholder issues, and governance 
policies
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5.7 Enforcement 
 
Tables 19, 20, and 21 show the results related to the enforcement of the code in each country and in 
the OECD Principles. 
 
United Kingdom, Spain and Germany all have made their corporate governance codes on the comply-
or-explain basis, while the French code is states that it only gives recommendations on corporate 
governance. Of the former British colonies, only one code (Botswana) are based on the comply-or-
explain basis only, while two codes (Mauritius and Uganda) are partly mandatory and partly on a 
comply-or-explain basis. However, South Africa makes an exception by clearly stating that rather 
than the comply-or-explain model, it follows the apply-or-explain model. Although Malawi, Uganda 
and United Kingdom express that their codes follow the comply-or-explain model, they still states 
that some of its principles are mandatory in nature, and therefore they do not truly fulfil the 
requirements of comply-or-explain model.  While the French code only gives recommendations, its 
former colonies Tunisia and Morocco have rather adopted the comply-or-explain model. The former 
German and British colonies Nigeria and Ghana have not followed either of their colonizers’ example, 
as Ghana only lists recommendations and Nigeria lists the minimum standards for corporate 
governance in the country. However, Nigeria, while listing minimum requirements for listed 
companies, also requires companies to disclose the level of compliance with the code, and thus it 
would seem to follow also the comply-or-explain model. 
 
The application of the code varies between countries as well. While the UK code is aimed at all 
organisations, other European codes are primarily aimed at listed companies. Of the former British 
colonies five countries have aimed their codes also at all organisations, and also former French and 
Spanish colonies are aimed at all organisations. Thus, the majority of the African codes are aimed at 
all organisations rather than only listed companies. Also some countries, such as Morocco and 
Tunisia, have either issued special codes or specified section in their official general code aimed at 
family-owned companies. Only Botswana and Uganda have aimed their codes only at listed 
companies in the country.
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Table 19 Enforcement: UK and its colonies 
 
 
Table 20 Enforcement: France, Spain and their colonies 
 
 
Table 21 Enforcement: Germany and its colonies and OECD Principles
United Kingdom Botswana Egypt Kenya Malawi Mauritius South Africa Uganda Zimbabwe
Enforcement Comply or explain Comply or explain Recommendations Recommendations Comply or explain Comply or 
explain/mandatory
Apply or explain Minimum standards/ 
Comply or explain
Recommendations
Obligatory Main principles N/A N/A N/A Main principles Listed companies N/A Prescriptive standards N/A
Voluntary Supporting principles N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Non-prescriptive standards N/A
Application All organisations Listed companies All organisations, 
primarily listed and 
closed or family-held 
joint stock companies
All organisations All organisations, listed 
companies own 
additional standards
Listed, financial, 
state-owned, and 
large public and 
private companies
All organisations Listed companies All organisations
France Algeria Tunisia Morocco Spain
Enforcement Recommendations Recommendations Comply or explain Comply or explain Comply or explain
Obligatory N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Voluntary N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Application Listed companies, 
SMEs encouraged
All organisations All organisations, special 
family-companies section
All companies, targeted 
codes for SMEs, family-
companies, credit institutions
Listed companies
Germany Ghana Nigeria OECD
Enforcement Comply or explain Recommendations Minimum standards Not-binding, no aim at 
detailed prescriptions
Obligatory "Shall" recommendations 
need explanations
N/A Listed companies minimum 
compliance
N/A
Voluntary "Should" 
recommendations can be 
deviated without 
disclosure
N/A Fund raisers sufficient 
compliance
N/A
Application Listed companies Listed companies, 
investment advisers, 
mutual funds and issuers of 
publicly traded securities
Listed companies and 
companies seeking to raise 
funds from capital markets
Listed companies, non-traded 
encouraged
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5.8 Corruption 
 
In this section we describe how different codes have addressed illegal and problematic issues, such 
as corruption, conflict of interest, and risk management. Table 22 shows information that addresses 
issues such as illegal actions and corruption in each country’s code, and table 23 shows the ranks and 
scores of each African country and European countries in our study. 
 
Countries that explicitly mention corruption in their codes are Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, South 
Africa, Tunisia, and Zimbabwe. Of these countries, Kenya and Nigeria make the most profound and 
numerous mentions to illegal actions, corruption and tolerance to these issues. However, some African 
countries do not have any specific recommendations for preventing illegal actions, but rather just 
encourage companies to adopt code of conducts that should be used to minimise conflicts of interests. 
Algeria, Egypt, and Mauritius are examples of countries that only identify these conflicts of interests 
as major problems that should be avoided with better governance, but make no mention of corruption 
as a major issue in the country.  
 
Also the German corporate governance code addresses the problems that may relate to corruption by 
stating that managers or employees shall not demand or accept payments or other advantages from 
third parties in their work. However, other European countries do not address corruption related 
problems in their codes, but rather describe the risks and other issues that may be problematic in the 
eyes of the public. Therefore, European codes in general are not so concerned about the possible 
corruption in their country, but rather emphasise issues that relate to risk management in general. 
British code is mostly concerned of risk management issues and especially financial risks and 
solvency issues. However, the Spanish code requires that transactions and shares created for tax 
havens or similar tax minimising schemes should be disclosed. French code only refers to prevention 
of any conflicts of interest. In conclusion, European countries do not address corruption specifically 
as an issue in their country, but many of African countries in our sample do.
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Table 22 Corruption and risk management 
 
Next we shall present the Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index from 2014. We 
shall present the placements of the countries of our sample, as well as the remaining African countries, 
which currently do not have a corporate governance code in place. The index, total 175 countries, has 
been divided into quarters of equal size in relation to the total amount of countries, to represent the 
most, second most, second least, and least corrupt countries in the world. We have also included a 
reference score from CPI from the year before the corporate governance code was published. 
Algeria Botswana Egypt Ghana Kenya
Anticipate any conflicts of 
interest in board.
Directors Report should declare 
that the company has not 
engaged in any activities which 
contrive laws and regulations. If 
there is no internal audit function 
in a company, then company 
should from time to time review 
the need for one.
Define regulations and 
procedures to avoid conflict of 
interest, and also code of 
conduct should be established. 
Especially family-held 
companies and closed joint stock 
companies are encouraged to 
adopt these principles.
The annual report should contain 
a statement from the board as to 
the degree of compliance of the 
corporate body with any 
regulatory and other legal 
requirements governing its 
operations and the extent to 
which statutory payments have 
been met in respect of the period 
under review
It is neither in long-term interest of 
the enterprise or society to short -- 
to engage in corrupt acts. Directors 
shall disclose any gifts, monies, 
commissions, benefits and other 
favours -- received from 
whatsoever party in relation to 
any business dealings with the 
company. Every year disclosed 
that no person of authority 
commited any offence under the 
Prevention of Corruption Act.
Malawi Mauritius Morocco Nigeria South Africa
Related party transactions 
should be identified, managed 
and disclosed: board members 
and key management 
personnel, significant 
influence, family member, 
joint control organisations. 
Purchases and sales of assets, 
services, leases and loans and 
equity contributions. Owners 
should be informed of all 
these that may affect 
significantly their position.
Code of conduct for dealing with 
potential conflicts of interest, 
disclosure on related party 
transactions
Thanking of members of the 
Anticorruption Commission of 
the CGEM, members finding to 
be in a situation of conflict of 
interest should abstain from 
participation in discussions and 
decision-making. Information 
disclosure on the securities 
transactions of their principle 
key executives and directors 
who directly or indirectly hold 
more than 5% of the capital
Directors should not be members 
of boards of companies in the 
same industry to avoid conflict of 
interests. Not more than two 
members of same family on board 
simultaneously. Cross-
memberships discouraged. 
Companies should recognise 
corruption as a major threat, and 
have zero tolerance of corruption. 
Directors code of ethics states 
that they should not take 
advantage of company property 
for personal gain.
Internal audit function should 
provide a source of information as 
appropriate, regarding instances of 
fraud, corruption, unethical 
behaviour and irregularities.
Tunisia Uganda Zimbabwe OECD
Prevent any conflict of 
interest, strong stance against 
corruption, bribery and 
extortion, prohibit offering or 
accepting to pay public 
officials any fraction of a 
contract payment, and 
companies should avoid tax 
evasion
Any departure from IFRS should 
be explained in annual report. 
Audit committee should consider 
and identify any related party 
transactions thay may occur.
There must be will-power to 
fight corruption from the top 
leadership of a country which 
should cascade down the 
leadership ladder, which must 
filter through to the board of 
directors and management of 
corporations
Stakeholders, including individual 
employees, should be able to 
freely communicate their 
concerns about illegal or 
unethicalpractices to the board 
and their rights should not be 
compromised for doing this, 
companies should establish 
procedures and safe-harbours for 
complaints by employees
German France Spain United Kingdom
Management and employees 
may not demand nor accept 
from third parties payments 
or other advantages nor grant 
third parties unlawful 
advantages.
Encouraged to produce an 
internal rules and procedures 
document, which must state in 
how the board is organised, 
notably in relation to the 
prevention and management of
conflicts of interest as well as 
give details of the ethical rules its 
members intend to use as their 
guidelines.
Disclosure by audit committee 
of creation of shares in special 
purpose vehicles or territories 
considered tax havens, and 
related-party transactions. The 
moment a director is indicted or 
tried for any of the offences, the 
board of directors should open 
an investigation and decide 
whether or not he or she
should be called on to resign.
Confirmation by the directors 
that they have carried out a 
robust assessment of
the principal risks facing the 
company, including those that 
would threaten its
business model, future 
performance, solvency or 
liquidity.
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Table 23 Transparency International CPI ranks and scores of colonies and colonizers
Germany 12 79 2013 78
United Kingdom 14 78 2013 76
Belgium 15 76 2008 73
France 26 69 2010 68
Botswana 31 63 2007 54
Portugal 31 63 2013 62
Spain 37 60 2014 60
Cape Verde 42 57
Seychelles 43 55
Mauritius 47 54 2011 51
Lesotho 55 49
Namibia 55 49
Rwanda 55 49
Ghana 61 48 2009 39
South Africa 67 44 2008 49
Italy 69 43 2013 43
Senegal 69 43
Swaziland 69 43
Sao Tome and Principe 76 42
Tunisia 79 40 2007 42
Benin 80 39
Morocco 80 39 2007 35
Burkina Faso 85 38
Zambia 85 38
Egypt 94 37 2005 34
Gabon 94 37
Liberia 94 37
Algeria 100 36 2008 32
Niger 103 35
Djibouti 107 34
Ethiopia 110 33
Malawi 110 33 2010 34
Ivory Coast 115 32
Mali 115 32
Mozambique 119 31
Sierra Leone 119 31
Tanzania 119 31
Mauritania 124 30
Gambia 126 29
Togo 126 29
Madagascar 133 28
Timor-Leste 133 28
Russia 136 27 2013 28
Cameroon 136 27
Nigeria 136 27 2010 24
Uganda 142 26 2002 21
Guinea 145 25
Kenya 145 25 2002 19
Papua New Guinea 145 25
Central African Republic 150 24
Republic of Congo 152 23
Chad 154 22
Democratic Republic of Congo 154 22
Zimbabwe 156 21
Burundi 159 20
Angola 161 19
Guinea-Bissau 161 19
Eritrea 166 18
Libya 166 18
Somalia 174 8
Country
Year 
before 
Score 
(X)
Score 
(2014)
Rank
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All of the European countries of our sample are in the least corrupt quarter, and each colonizer places 
higher on the index than its former colonies. Also two African countries place in the least corrupt 
quarter of the index, Cape Verde and Botswana. However, if for example Russia would have qualified 
in the comparison of our study with its colony Djibouti, Russia (136th) would have placed 
significantly lower than its former colony Djibouti (107th). Therefore, although in our sample it seems 
that the European colonizer is always ahead of its former colonies, this is only true because of our 
sample selection. Spain also places lower than one of African country, Botswana. Therefore, although 
European countries in general are less corrupt according to the index, all of the European countries 
are not above all of the African countries. 
 
An expected result is that countries with highest corruption levels do not have a corporate governance 
guideline at all in place at the moment. Most of the countries in Africa that already have a corporate 
governance code in place are in the second least corrupt quarter, with five countries of our sample 
being in this category. The second highest concentration of our sample countries is in the most corrupt 
quarter (four countries), then in the second most corrupt (three countries), and lastly, the lowest 
concentration of African countries, which have a governance code in place is in the least corrupt 
quarter. Therefore, in all of quarters there are African countries that have a corporate governance code 
in place. 
 
 
Table 24 Statistical results of corruption 
 
Table 24 shows the means and median scores of African countries divided from the CPI from 2014. 
The mean and median scores of those African countries, which have a corporate governance code in 
place at the moment are higher than African countries in general, and therefore higher than African 
countries without a code. Countries without a code have approximately 6 points lower scores than 
countries with corporate a governance code on average compared both with mean and medium scores 
in the data. However, the mean and median scores of the total 175 of countries in the index is higher 
than the averages of even those African countries that have a corporate governance code in place. 
43,2
38
33,5
33
Mean African countries with code 37,9
Median African countries with code 37
Mean score of African countries without code 31,8
Median score of African countries without code 31
Mean score of total 175 countries
Median score of total 175 countries
Mean score of African countries
Median score of African countries
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6 Discussion 
 
6.1 Fitting with the emerging market environment 
 
6.1.1 Internal governance mechanisms 
 
 
According to theory, when external governance mechanisms and external financial markets are 
insufficient and undeveloped, companies should rely more on internal governance mechanisms 
(Munisi et al., 2014). Therefore, particularly the board of directors is an important governance 
mechanism in emerging markets. This seems to be very well understood in all of African codes, as 
they all address and emphasise the recommendations related to board of directors. All of the codes 
address at least the board of director in their codes, and even the most basic codes define board’s role 
and responsibilities, and give at least some guidelines on the structure and diversity of the board. 
Some of the codes, such as Malawi, only address issues that relate to board of directors, while leaving 
out, for example, recommendations related to shareholder rights or other major stakeholders. 
Therefore, it would seem that even though the development of the code would still be lacking in 
sophistication or detail of more developed countries, even those African countries that would be 
behind in the development of corporate governance are in fact focusing their recommendations on 
the right and most efficient governance mechanism for their environment. 
 
However, the size and diversity recommendations of the board differ among countries. As there have 
been mixed findings on the effectiveness of larger boards (Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007; Hermalin & 
Weisbach, 2001), it is not surprising that majority of the codes do not recommend a clear size or 
especially the maximum amount of directors. However, when minimum and maximum sizes are 
mentioned, many times the amounts come from hard law legislation, which is quite surprising, as 
there have been mixed views on the optimal size, and that making any strict rules in hard law could 
limit companies and their flexibility too much. Also it is noteworthy that even though larger boards 
have been found to enhance firm value in Africa (Kyereboah-Coleman), the maximum sizes that are 
recommended are significantly lower than, for example, the average size boards in Germany with 
large boards, and that they rather follow Anglo-Saxon norm of smaller boards (see Kraakman et al., 
2009). It is possible that larger boards in Africa would be more effective in Africa as is would allow 
more independent directors on board. However, the smallness of the market (Luo, 2013) means that 
finding truly independent as well as qualified directors is hard, and therefore the recommendations 
rather suggest smaller boards so that the recommended amount and relation of independent directors 
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can be achieved. Although we realise that finding the appropriate amount of truly independent and 
professional directors can be even harder in some countries than in others, we still argue that all codes 
should recommend the amount of independent directors and demand that such directors should be 
appointed. Especially in Kenya, which is the second most corrupt country of our sample, 
recommending only the amount of non-executive directors can be considered inadequate. 
Recommending the inclusion of independent directors might not be enough either. The current 
recommendations of countries such as Nigeria, Malawi, and Uganda, which require that only one 
member should be independent, might not be enough as it is possible that only a few independent 
directors do not have the power to influence board decisions significantly (Black et al., 2012) and that 
arbitrary low levels of independent directors can be ineffective (see Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013). 
However, South African recommendation that majority of the board should be non-executives, and 
of them the majority should be independent, might be unobtainable for many countries due to the 
smallness of the market, although it might be otherwise very effective governance mechanism. 
 
Hence we suggest that the countries should strive for increasing the amount of independent directors 
in their codes when the market conditions allow it, and at the same time adjust the limitations on the 
amount of multiple directorships and audit committee members for example. For example, in Kenya 
the maximum amount is 10 directorships, as the experienced directors are needed in multiple boards 
and therefore the recommendations may be appropriate for the context at the moment. However, as 
the managerial and director markets expand, the limitations should be moved closer to the level of 
European countries with stricter limitations. Also, allowing people outside the board to be members 
of the audit committee (such as in Egypt) can be considered appropriate to increase the amount of 
independence of auditing before sufficient sized markets of full-time directors have been developed. 
In addition, we suggest that clearly separating non-executive and independent directors by criteria 
should be present in all of the codes, as for example Nigeria has done since its first code which did 
not have such recommendation, as this can help to improve the credibility of said code in the eyes of 
investors and other stakeholders. The independence criteria in African codes are already close to the 
same recommendations of Europe although the market sizes differ. However, we do not suggest that 
the criteria in general should be changed or lowered so that more directors could be on paper 
considered “independent”, as in reality their independence would still be compromised.  
 
One of the biggest convergences in both European and African governance codes is also the 
separation of the positions of chief executive officer’s and chairman of the board. Having all except 
one African countries recommend the separation can be seen as a development from the previous 
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comparative corporate governance code report by Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP from 2000, as before 
only a small amount of emerging markets made any recommendations on the separation of the two 
positions. Although the sample is not the same, as South Africa is the only country of our sample that 
was included in their comparison, we can conclude that the awareness that combining the positions 
might affect firm value negatively has grown also in less developed markets and progress has been 
made in this regard. Although the labour markets are smaller in Africa as has been mentioned (Luo, 
2013) and therefore expertise on the board may be harder to achieve, it has still been found that even 
in Africa that combining positions of CEO and chairman affects shareholder value negatively 
(Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007). Therefore, having countries recommend the separation is important as 
African markets have many problems related to corruption and overly concentrated power and 
ownership which can expropriate investors, and therefore entrusting too much power for only one 
person could increase these problems even further. In this regard African countries seem to be very 
well fitted to their environment. Although it has been argued that combining the positions could 
increase the company and industry expertise of the board (Fama & Jensen, 1983), we do not agree 
with the Spanish code which takes no position on the matter, but rather suggest that African countries 
which currently are developing their codes should recommend the positions of to be separated too. 
However, as it is true that the business expertise of the board might be lower if the CEO is not a board 
member and the amount of executive directors would be limited too much, and especially in some 
countries in Africa where finding qualified people for the board might be hard, we suggest that 
recommendations could state that managers could be heard at meetings even though they would not 
have voting rights. 
 
Many times institutionally and bank-based governance systems are considered to be more suitable 
for developing countries without highly developed and functioning financial markets (Rwegasira, 
2000).  Therefore also the codes of African countries, especially those which are less developed and 
have small amounts of listed companies, should strive for encouraging institutional investors to use 
their control right over the management as a substitute for market for corporate control (Young et al., 
2008). Only few codes have addressed this issue by stating that institutional investors are especially 
encouraged to influence companies and demand compliance with corporate governance codes due to 
“lack of sophistication of domestic individual investors” (Corporate Governance Guidelines on Best 
Practices – Ghana, 2010). However, principal-principal problems can be especially problematic when 
concentrated ownership is used as a substitute for market based governance and control systems 
(Young et al.). Bebchuk and Hamdani (2009) suggest that mechanisms such as one-share-one-vote 
and cumulative voting can be used as minority rights protection mechanisms, but only five African 
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countries recommend the one-share-one-vote practice explicitly. Quite surprisingly Egypt, which is 
both Muslim and religious law based country, recommends both of these mechanism, although its 
background has been found to be associated with lower investor right protection (La Porta et al., 
1998; Stulz & Williamson, 2003). As more developed countries, such as United Kingdom especially, 
do allow these practices in legislation but does not give clear recommendations on the issue, and 
without a clear recommendation from the OECD Principles either, African countries may feel that 
recommending or requiring such practice explicitly would be too bold for them as other countries do 
not give them either. Therefore, African codes may result to be more conservative than their 
environment would demand. We also point out that while other voting right restrictions, such as the 
one-shareholder-one-vote practice in Nigeria, can improve the rights of minority shareholders, they 
can also be harmful as the expertise of minority shareholders might be lower in these markets. Thus, 
it is important that recommendations for inclusion of institutional investors are in place too. 
Therefore, codes should strive for a balance between minority rights and institutional investor 
inclusion and address both stakeholders’ rights and encourage both to participate. However, at the 
moment many codes seem to be lacking at least in one or the other aspect. 
 
6.1.2 Remuneration 
 
Recommending performance related compensation on executive directors is one of the biggest 
convergences in our sample between colonies and colonizers. Many of the African corporate 
governance codes have followed the example of developed countries by recommending performance 
related remuneration of directors and executive directors. However, for example Luo (2013) has 
criticised the use of Anglo-Saxon performance related compensation mechanisms in emerging 
markets, as the economic situation and market features are not similar, such as the development and 
size of managerial labour markets, and ownership structures. In addition, as the remuneration is an 
issue in developing markets, as the payment gap between rich and poor is large (Scholtz & Smit, 
2012), it might not be advisable to excessively use performance related compensation that could even 
further increase the gap. Also, having shareholders approving the remuneration policies of directors, 
say-on-pay, should increase the accountability of executives to shareholders (Scholtz & Smit, 2012). 
Therefore, if African countries do recommend extensive performance related payments, they could 
also recommend the say-on-pay policy to minimise some of the risks related to it. However, although 
all African countries in our sample recommend performance related executive remuneration, only 
Malawi, Mauritius, South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Morocco recommend that say-on pay-policy should 
be used. Although the African countries in our sample have partly adopted different remuneration 
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schemes, for example by recommending that non-executives should be compensated by attendance 
fees only, the compensation policies do not seem to be significantly in line with theory, which 
suggests that performance related remuneration of the Anglo-Saxon model should not be used. It can 
be argued that as performance related remuneration is many times considered the norm in developed 
markets and the basic answer to principal-agency problems (Luo), African countries have just 
mimicked the prevailing method without considering that these problems are not as relevant for them 
as the prevailing problems are more related to principal-principal relationships (Young et al., 2008). 
Also as the general OECD Principles state that compensation should be long-term based, it can be 
seen that this means that compensation should be based on performance related mechanisms, such as 
share options only. 
 
One major divergence between the corporate governance recommendations of European colonizers 
and former African colonies is the benchmarking of remuneration policies and levels with other 
companies. While African countries have started to recommend comparing and benchmarking 
compensation to peer companies, European countries in their recommendations have started to take 
steps to the opposite direction. For example, the previous Combined Code on Corporate Governance 
in the United Kingdom from 2008 still began its remuneration recommendation by stating that the 
remuneration should be “sufficient to attract, retain and motivate directors”, but in the revised code 
from 2014 this line is no longer used anywhere in the recommendations. However, some of the former 
British colonies, Kenya, Egypt, and Nigeria, have this recommendation in their codes, so it could be 
that they have mimicked the code of their colonizer before the UK code was updated. However, for 
example South African code has been issued after the financial crisis, and even though it is many 
times considered the supreme country of the continent in corporate governance, King III makes no 
recommendation that the benchmarking should be even partly limited. However, the Nigerian code 
has also been issued after the financial crisis and it at least recommends upper limits on the share 
options. The newest update to the UK Combined Code also has emphasised that the compensations 
should be linked to long-term performance, while their previous code did not mention in any way that 
the remuneration should be specifically linked to long-term performance, but only be aligned with 
shareholder interests. The trend of reacting to the discussion of executive compensation can be seen 
in European countries in recommending setting upper limits, avoiding ratcheting, and schemes that 
allow companies to recover already paid sums or withhold payments. Although the trend therefore in 
Europe would seem to be to recommend moderation and caution especially in avoiding ratcheting, at 
the same time Spain has removed from its code earlier recommendations that the compensation 
should not be based on averages of peer companies and recommends that compensation should be 
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negotiated with the CEO. Therefore, although some changes have been made to the remuneration 
recommendations, the shift has not yet been extensive in whole Europe, and it is unclear why 
especially Spain would have adopted this opposite route, as Spanish economy especially has had 
severe problems since the financial crisis. 
 
It seems evident that the criticism directed at companies after the financial crises of recent years, for 
allowing and supporting excessive bonus schemes and share option schemes for example, have made 
developed countries more cautious in their compensation recommendations. However, African codes 
are not as cautious in restraining remuneration and limiting ratcheting and excessive benchmarking, 
as Nigeria is the only country that recommends upper limits on at least a part of the payments. This 
would be in line with the suggestion that financial crises are not as significant in emerging markets 
as they are in already developed markets (Chen et al., 2009), and therefore the discussion on the 
compensation of executives would not have affected African governance as much. However, many 
of the developed countries have updated their codes more frequently in the past and have a relevant 
history and resources for continuously updating their codes, and therefore they have had to update 
their code because reaction to criticism is practically mandated from them by the investors. However, 
many of the codes made by African countries have been published prior to the recent financial crisis, 
and as the countries’ image in the eyes of the investors may not have been as severely damaged, the 
countries have not seen the need to update their codes just to address issues that have been up to 
debate in more developed markets. Also the increased disclosure requirements of European 
Commission, on for example the payment ratios between average employees and top executives of 
public companies have probably affected the stricter guidelines in Europe. In addition, the increasing 
attention given in the French code for example to encourage and allow shareholders to decide on 
executive directors’ compensation policies, say-on-pay, is a sign of responding to the criticism on 
excessive compensation policies and empowering shareholders more and increase accountability 
(Scholtz & Smit, 2012). Therefore, the divergence between European colonizers and African colonies 
is most likely due to legislative changes in the European Union level, and the financial crisis and its 
aftermath in the media which have made countries more cautious in their remuneration policy 
recommendations in Europe, while the same effects have not at least yet been seen in African codes. 
 
6.1.3 Inclusive model of corporate governance 
 
From the data of this study, it becomes clear that many of the African countries have adopted to 
promote the wider inclusive model of corporate governance, which takes into account society and 
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community values and expectations more profoundly than the traditional governance perspective of 
just owners and managers. This is in line with the ubuntu value system prevalent in Africa (Rossouw, 
2005). Especially the difference can be seen between the Anglo-Saxon United Kingdom code and its 
former colonies. While other European countries in our sample have included other stakeholders and 
addressed sustainability issues at least partly in their codes, United Kingdom does not address any 
other stakeholders directly, and only briefly mentions that social issues should be considered. 
However, nearly all of its former colonies address these issues very profoundly, with Botswana being 
the major exception in the whole sample. Even Nigeria, which Rossouw (2005) found to be the only 
country in Africa which did not commit to this inclusive model of corporate governance, has now one 
of the most profound recommendations for stakeholder inclusion and social responsibility. Also the 
ubuntu value system (Mangaliso, 2001) is for example mentioned explicitly in two of the codes, and 
other codes express indirectly that local communities, environment and other stakeholders should be 
taken into account in business decisions. 
 
It seems that African codes are ahead of European countries in the inclusion other stakeholders’ 
interests into corporate governance codes and recommendations. However, changes have been seen 
also in European codes. While in the previous guideline from 2006, Spain stated that their corporate 
governance report should not to be confused with corporate social responsibility and therefore the 
governance code did not address other stakeholders almost at all, now in their updated code from 
2015 these issues are included in the code. However, we should not immediately think that the 
corporate governance codes would be the only ones to consider when considering the inclusion of 
stakeholders’ interests. GRI-reporting on companies’ corporate social responsibility for example is 
becoming mandatory for listed companies in many countries in near future in Europe. Therefore, even 
though it would seem that the rights and wishes of other stakeholders are not as well considered in 
developed economies’ and colonising countries’ codes, these wishes have probably been incorporated 
into the sustainability reporting requirements in these countries. However, for example the GRI-
guidelines are still for many companies voluntary in nature and the scope of reporting differs between 
companies according to materiality of issues. Therefore, incorporating other stakeholder interests at 
least partly to the corporate governance codes, especially to those that are aimed at all organisations, 
could improve corporate responsibility more indirectly, which in turn could lead to same benefits that 
improved traditional corporate governance would. Therefore, although we do realise that corporate 
governance and corporate responsibility are different issues, they can have the same benefits of 
improving shareholder value and attracting certain investor types, and therefore their guidelines could 
be more combined and streamlined to achieve these benefits better. 
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Separate guidelines can improve both governance and responsibility issues by being more detailed 
and demanding in their own guidelines. This said, the case of Africa, we suggest that it can be more 
beneficial to have the corporate governance codes address other stakeholders specifically rather than 
issuing separate guidelines for corporate governance and corporate responsibility at this state. First 
of all, as many of the emerging countries are only just developing more sophisticated procedures in 
their business life, through basic annual financial reporting for example, excessive amount of separate 
reporting requirements could easily become excessive for firms. If issues such as employee rights, 
health issues, and host community inclusion would be only left for another voluntary guideline, such 
as GRI, then the likelihood of firms adopting and considering these recommendations would be lower. 
After all, committing to good corporate governance may be the primer step that companies may want 
or have to take, for example while listing to stock exchanges, and prioritisation has to be made. 
 
To conclude this part of the discussion, we argue that the recommendations are not sufficiently 
directed at mitigating the principal-principal problems which are the major problems in emerging 
markets with concentrated ownership (Young et al, 2008). The recommendations related to protection 
of minority shareholders in many codes seem to be vague and in name only, and clear 
recommendations, for example relating to voting rights, are not yet prevalent enough in Africa. 
Instead, codes address issues related the principal-agency problems, for example with their 
performance related remuneration recommendations, rather than empowering minority shareholders 
with, for example, say on pay policies or cumulative voting practices. 
 
6.2 Corruption 
 
One of the major questions for corporate governance in relation to corruption is, whether companies 
in more corrupt countries can overcome the problems caused by corruption with stronger governance. 
Dass et al. (2014) argue that higher quality corporate governance would be specially important and 
valuable to companies which operate in areas with higher local corruption, and could help companies 
to overcome at least partly the corruption problems caused by weak institutions. However, for 
example Durnev and Fauver (2007) argue that the positive effect of higher quality governance is 
weaker or even non-existent in more predatory states where corruption is evident. An expected result 
is that countries with highest corruption levels do not have a corporate governance guideline at all in 
place at the moment in Africa. Our study findings, which show that both the mean and median of 
those African countries which have a corporate governance code are higher than of those African 
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countries which do not currently have a code, thus support the argument that problems of corruption 
can be fought with stronger corporate governance. Also, as the mean and medians are approximately 
the same inside each group of countries, the statistics are not significantly skewed to either end of the 
index, therefore making this suggestion more plausible. 
 
Countries that explicitly mention corruption in their codes are not only limited to those countries that 
are in the most corrupt quarter of the CPI, but the majority of the countries in the bottom of the CPI 
(Kenya, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe) do mention corruption in their codes explicitly. For example, Okike 
(2003) criticised Nigerian code from 2003 for not mentioning corruption as an issue in the country 
and stated that it was suspicious, so therefore in this regard it seems that their code has become more 
credible in building good governance practices in the country by addressing those issues that are 
important to said country in particular, rather than merely copying codes from other countries. Kenya 
and Nigeria make the most profound and numerous mentions to illegal actions, corruption and 
tolerance to these issues of the whole sample, which means that at least in these countries corruption 
has been identified as a major problem and the codes have been built to fight this issue.  
 
It has been found that firms in more corrupt areas disclose less information (Durnev & Fauver, 2007). 
This can be seen partly in the information disclosure recommendations, as the most corrupt countries 
according to the CPI, Kenya and Uganda, recommend only financial disclosure and Kenya states that 
even half-yearly disclosure is only a recommendation, but for example Nigeria, which is also in the 
group of most corrupt countries, recommends companies to publish many different reports related to 
finance, governance, social issues, and especially encourages companies to report any unethical or 
illegal activities that may occur. At the same time some of the least corrupt countries in our sample, 
United Kingdom, France, and Botswana, do not explicitly recommend multiple reports on specific 
issues, but rather encourage regular financial reporting. It can be that as these countries are in fact 
already in the top of the CPI, there is no specific need to encourage companies for more reporting as 
the requirements by law are already extensive and powerful enough. Also in developed markets listing 
on stock exchanges may already contain the reporting requirements for governance and responsibility 
for example, and therefore specific recommendations are not as needed in these markets. 
 
Dass et al. (2014) also suggest that all firms can benefit from exogenous shocks to corporate 
governance (such as Sarbanes Oxley Act) but even more so if they are in corrupt environments. 
Therefore, in theory adopting a more hard law based corporate governance standards should increase 
the benefits of governance to companies especially in more corrupt countries. In this regard the 
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comply-or-explain model might not be the most powerful enforcement mechanism, especially as it 
has been found that many times the explanations are standard responses rather than a result of actual 
analysis and justified reasons (Arcot et al., 2010).  As only four countries make their corporate 
governance code mandatory at least partly (Mauritius, Nigeria, Uganda, and United Kingdom), the 
countries that have adopted this mandatory approach are in a minority. Of these countries Uganda 
and Nigeria are considered to be highly corrupt, so therefore these codes should be especially 
beneficial for fighting corruption. Although both of these countries have received higher scores in 
2014 on the CPI than before the newest code was introduced, also Kenya, which is also highly corrupt 
but has only given voluntary recommendations for governance, has increased its score approximately 
the same amount yearly. Mauritius on the other hand is in the second least corrupt group, but has also 
improved its score approximately at a similar pace as, for example, Nigeria. However, Botswana 
(comply-or-explain) and Ghana (recommendations), which are considered significantly less corrupt 
countries, have increased their score relatively more since the publishing of their codes, without strict 
mandatory requirements. Although there are multiple reasons for improving the score on the index, it 
is clear that corruption can be fought and scores on the CPI can be improved with soft-law based 
systems as well. As it has been argued that voluntary codes serve more as moral value guidance 
(Wymeersch, 2006), it is possible that such an embedded value guidance can be equally beneficial in 
African environment. As the culture already is very much based on communal values (Rossouw, 
2005), the moral guidance of voluntary corporate governance recommendations would not be built 
on a shaky ground, and thus voluntary guidelines would be more beneficial than in countries where 
such a strong value system would not be present. It is also noteworthy that the principles which come 
from legislation, are not related to corruption, but rather on board size and shareholder rights. This 
could be as the culture of corruption has persisted despite of company laws for years, corporate 
governance codes have been considered to be the next possible step in fighting the problem. 
 
For the codes to be especially effective in relation to corruption, application of the codes could be 
extended to reach all organisations. The amount of listed companies is limited in the African market, 
as the majority of the companies are still informal, family-owned and only a small amount of the 
companies are listed in stock exchanges (Okeahalam, 2004). Hence, making corporate governance 
codes explicitly state that they are targeted for listed companies can give the wrong message to the 
larger corporate market that good corporate governance is only relevant for a limited amount of 
companies. Therefore, African countries should follow more the example of South Africa and Kenya 
for example, which have aimed their codes at all organisations, or make their specific 
recommendations for family-owned businesses, as for example, Tunisia has made. However, also the 
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enforcement of the code should be considered when issuing the code. It is confusing that even United 
Kingdom has made its code’s enforcement difficult to understand by stating that the code on the one 
hand describes minimum standards, but on the other hand it states clearly that the code is comply-or-
explain based. Also, some African countries have these confusing enforcement guidelines; for 
example, Uganda. For United Kingdom, which is less corrupt and more developed in terms of 
economy and governance practices, this is less confusing probably, but for companies and directors 
in countries with less developed and long history with governance matters confusing enforcement 
might be more harmful. These kind of enforcement guidelines might decrease the potential benefits 
of applying codes flexibly and by altering them to fit companies own context (Aguilera et al., 2008), 
as companies would try to comply with all the guidelines in such a situation, even though the code 
would actually be comply-or-explain based. Therefore, countries should give special attention in 
developing their codes that no such confusing enforcement mechanism would be given in the codes. 
 
Mauritius, Nigeria, and South Africa also recommend the appointment of a specialised Risk 
committee. While usually risk management can be seen as a traditional part of the whole board, and 
that specific committee would be excessive, inefficient or unnecessary, we argue differently. In the 
case of Nigeria especially, when the country is in the bottom of the CPI, having a specific committee 
devoted to risk management and compliance with regulation and laws does not seem excessive at this 
phase of the Nigerian economy development and similar approach could also be adopted in other 
countries as well. Although the smallness of the labour markets (Luo, 2013) restrict much of the more 
sophisticated independence and professional criteria of audit committee members for example, the 
recommendations of having only one person on the committee who is “financially literate” and has 
only basic knowledge of accounting is not enough for Nigeria for example, as it can enable a more 
manipulation of the figures and increase corruption (Neu et al., 2013). 
 
6.3 Origins 
 
Preliminary assumption is that African countries would have followed their colonial power countries' 
example in designing and defining their own national codes because of path dependency (Bebchuk 
& Roe, 1999). Therefore, it could be assumed that there would be a lot of similarities with for British 
corporate governance, as Great Britain has been the major colonizer compared to, for example, Spain. 
However, as the examples from Nigeria (Okike, 2007: Ahunwan, 2002) would suggest, mimicking a 
corporate governance system from another country is not very effective if the environment does not 
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support it, and therefore it could be assumed that the corporate governance codes in Africa should be 
more like hybrids. The contingency theory (Otley, 1980) and studies on developed and emerging 
markets (for example Bebchuk & Hamdani, 2009) support this argument. In addition, African 
countries may have wanted to follow the internationally recognised corporate governance standards 
of OECD rather than their colonizers’, if they wanted to adopt principles that would be considered to 
be applicable to a wide range of countries. However, as the Cadbury Report has been the basis for 
developing the OECD Principles of international governance standards (Jones & Pollitt, 2004), this 
probably has increased the impact of Anglo-Saxon governance models indirectly. Therefore, not only 
the countries that would due to their colonial heritage have stronger linkage to Anglo-Saxon corporate 
governance (such as Botswana, South Africa, or Zimbabwe), but also other Latin or German origin 
countries may have stronger resemblance to the Anglo-Saxon governance rather than on their own 
colonizers’ governance. For example, Morocco, Latin origin country, is an example of a country that 
has clearly taken inspiration from the OECD Principles, as it expresses that their code has been 
“widely inspired by the OECD corporate governance principles”. 
 
Looking at the sheer and absolute number of the corporate governance codes issued by former British 
colonies it is clear that African corporate governance is dominated at the moment by countries with 
British colonial origin. The newer corporate governance codes, which have been developed in Africa 
since Rossouw’s (2005) study, are from Egypt, Botswana, and Morocco. As Egypt and Botswana are 
both former British colonies, this means that the relative proportion of Anglo-Saxon or British model 
of corporate governance has grown even more in theory. Therefore, it is evident that in this regard 
African corporate governance in general should be a more Anglo-Saxon rather than, for example, 
Latin or Germanic (Weimer & Pape, 1999). 
 
Corporate governance mechanisms, which have been especially linked to the Anglo-Saxon 
governance are markets for corporate control and performance related payments (Weimer & Pape, 
1999). Our initial assumption was that as concentrated ownership is the main ownership structure in 
most of Africa and only a small amount of companies are listed (Rossouw, 2005), there would not be 
many recommendations relating to the market for corporate control, such as the use of anti-takeover 
measures, as they should be mainly unnecessary. This is mostly true, as only former British colonies 
Kenya and Ghana mention that the board should ensure that there is a functioning market for corporate 
control, and any specific recommendations (for example a position for or against anti-takeover 
measures) are absent in the African codes. Thus, in this way the codes do not seem to follow a very 
Anglo-Saxon approach to governance, but the codes rather have adopted the codes to fit their 
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environment and needs. However, in the case of performance related remuneration, all of the 
countries recommend that the remuneration of at least executive directors should be linked to 
company or individual performance. In this case the countries seem to have followed the Anglo-
Saxon governance regardless of their actual colonial heritage 
 
As clear separation of management and supervision is one of the major characteristic and foundation 
of German corporate governance, the fact that its former colonies have not adopted the same structure, 
even though the OECD principles do not recommend solely the unitary board either, implies that 
Germany has not had that large of an influence over its colonies’ governance. Also, the dual board 
system was not a new invention, as it was already written into legislation in 1870, during the colonial 
period (Morck & Steier, 2005), so therefore the lack of two tier board system in German colonies 
cannot be explained through a lack of legislative and formal, or even informal, model and example 
for developing such a system at the time also in Africa. Thus, it would seem that Germany has had a 
lower impact on the Ghanaian and Nigerian corporate governance than their other colonizer United 
Kingdom. There are a few possible major explanations for this. First of all, United Kingdom was the 
more recent colonizer for both of the countries, so as the corporate culture, governance, privatisation 
and economy of Africa has developed mainly in the last century, and concepts such as corporate 
governance have emerged only in last decades in Africa, it is presumable that more recent colonizer’s 
example has been the major influence and example. Also, United Kingdom has been the major 
example and many times forerunner in corporate governance institutions and mechanisms, for 
example in the introduction of the Cadbury Code (Jones & Pollitt, 2004). Thus, it would be 
presumable that Nigeria and Ghana, which have had two different example colonizers for corporate 
governance and company law to follow and no original history of their own for modern business 
practices, would have wanted to follow the more renounced and common way of building corporate 
governance. Lastly the smallness of the emerging countries’ managerial labour markets (Luo, 2013) 
(although Ghana and Nigeria both are considered to be in the richer group of African countries and 
therefore would probably have larger than average size market in African perspective) could mean 
that there might not be enough qualified people for building a truly functioning dual board system. 
For example, in Germany the board sizes are usually very large, especially due to the dual board 
system (see Kraakman et al., 2009) and therefore the managerial and independent director labour 
market could be too small to offer enough qualified managers and supervisory directors for both 
bodies. 
 
Therefore the effect an influence of Germanic corporate governance system (Weimer & Pape, 1999) 
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on former German colonies does not seem evident, and as another major Germanic practice of naming 
employees as a major stakeholder is not limited in our sample to former German colonies, it can be 
said that all in all the influence of Germanic governance system does not seem to be significant in 
African codes. Also, as former French and Spanish colonies all permit both board structures, as the 
Latin governance system does (Weimer & Pape, 1999), and therefore seem to have followed 
especially the French governance model, it is not the case that the dual board system would not be a 
totally unique even in African context. From these results we therefore conclude that in situations, 
where a country has had two colonizers, African countries have rather followed the internationally 
renounced OECD guidelines or British guidelines of same origin, than their Germanic governance 
model. 
 
Major divergence also between the colonizers and colonies is between the enforcement levels of the 
codes. There does not seem to be a clear pattern related to colonial heritage on this issue, as even 
though the colonizer would have a comply-or-explain basis for example, some of its former colonies 
have issued codes with the same basis, some are minimum standards and therefore mandatory, or 
purely voluntary recommendations. Therefore, the reasons for different enforcement levels of African 
codes do not seem to rely on the colonial heritage of the countries. The reasons might rather lie in 
inadequate and insufficient enforcement of the previous code; for example, the previous Nigerian 
code was only voluntary in nature, which is one the reasons that it was insufficient for the corrupt and 
challenging environment (Okike, 2007). Therefore, the enforcement has been tightened to mandatory 
minimum requirements to better fit the environment, rather than just mirroring the example of United 
Kingdom. Also Nigeria and other countries that have adopted minimum standard approach might fit 
better in their environment as Dass et al. (2014) suggest that mandatory requirements can be 
especially beneficial in corrupt environments. Also, rather than copying the comply-or-explain model 
of the colonizer, countries such as Kenya and Zimbabwe can encourage more companies to at least 
embed the spirit of good governance into a wider range of businesses by only giving 
recommendations. 
 
There are also some African codes that have been clearly mimicked from the corporate governance 
codes of their former colonizer. Much of the Ghanaian code reflects the British governance model, as 
it emphasises that improving corporate governance is a market led initiative and even advocates for 
functioning market for corporate control, even though traditionally emerging markets have weaker 
market for corporate control and it is not commonly used in emerging markets as a control mechanism 
(Mishra, 2011). In addition, some wordings of both Botswanan and Kenyan codes are almost exact 
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copies of the UK code, such as the requirements for information disclosure. However, it seems that 
these exact same recommendations and wordings of the colonizer’s code are not the norm in African 
countries, and the countries in our sample have developed at least partly some recommendation that 
are a result of their own reflections on the issues of governance. There are also no codes that would 
have all or even nearly all of the same recommendations as their colonizer, so therefore it seems clear 
that African countries have not merely mirrored their colonizers’ codes, although some countries such 
Botswana are closer to the UK code than for example Malawi or South Africa. Issues that show that 
the codes are not merely replicates of former colonizers are, for example, the mentions of corruption, 
inclusive model of corporate governance, and in some codes the encouragement of institutional 
investors to directly influence the company and board. In addition, the mentions of specific problems 
such as AIDS/HIV, malaria, and child labour are significant, as they clearly represent many of the 
problems that are more relevant for African context. One very unique statement is also from the code 
of Malawi which suggests that non-executive directors may be so committed to the mission of the 
company that they may want to work pro bono. As there is no mention of such issues in any European 
codes, it is clear that countries have identified at least in some aspects some guidelines especially for 
them. 
 
Stulz and Williamson (2003) have argued that Protestant countries protect investor rights and enforce 
these rights better than countries with other major religions. Christian countries in general should also 
have better investor rights protection than Muslim or Catholic countries according to Stulz and 
Williamson. However, our study sample gives somewhat mixed results on this issue. Although the 
countries, which do not have a corporate governance code in place are majorly either Muslim or 
Catholic countries, as Stulz and Williamson would suggest, there are major exceptions too. For 
example, Egypt, which is a Muslim country, is the only country in the whole sample which advises 
companies to adopt cumulative voting, which can be considered a major minority empowerment 
mechanism. Also, the one-share-one-vote practice is recommended in all of the Muslim countries of 
the sample while, for example, in United Kingdom (Protestant) or Spain (Catholic) codes there are 
no recommendations of its use. What is interesting also is that Morocco and Egypt, both highly 
Muslim countries, encourage and allow female board members as well, which can be somewhat 
related to minority right protection. All in all the Protestant countries of our sample do not seem to 
be more developed than countries of other religions, when we compare the actual code and the 
countries that have a code in place. We have used many of the same measurements that Stulz and 
Williamson have in their study, so therefore the results are also comparable. The reasons for these 
differences between our study and Stulz and Williamson are not very clear. However, we can 
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speculate that as for example in the OECD Principles or in the UK code there are no clear and specific 
recommendations many of the investor right protection issues, many of the African countries have no 
clear route to follow and have therefore taken inspiration from different places, such as from 
neighbouring countries in the case of Algeria, Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia for example. As there is 
also no clear consensus yet in more developed economies of these issues (see, for example, Rosser 
(s.a.) for the critique of the one-share-one-vote practice), this lack of clear influence or model can 
also explain why so many African countries of even Protestant background have not clearly 
recommended these mechanisms. 
 
When it comes to legal origin, La Porta et al. (1998) have stated that common law countries have 
better investor rights protection than civil law countries. In our sample, there is also a third group 
(excluding hybrids) of legal origin, which is religious or many times specifically sharia law based 
legal system. Therefore, according to theory countries with Anglo-Saxon traditions or English 
colonies should have better investor rights, and thus also the former British colonies in Africa should 
have higher investor protection than French, Spanish, or German colonies. Again for the countries 
that currently do not have a corporate governance code, this is mostly true as many of the countries 
are in fact civil law or civil and religious law combination countries. However, as we have discussed 
above, for example the Muslim countries in our sample that do have a code seem to recommend (or 
oblige in their legislation) many of the specific mechanisms and rights that are associated with 
stronger investor right protection. These Muslim countries are all hybrid legal systems with religious 
and civil law origin. Therefore, again it would seem that the suggestions of the previous literature 
would not totally be similar to our findings. For example, Malawi is a country with a common law 
legal system, but still does not recommend clearly nearly any of the mechanisms that would protect 
shareholders’ rights better. However, Malawi is also mainly a Catholic country, which can have an 
opposite effect on the investor right protection as Stulz and Williamson (2003) suggest. However, we 
do not suggest that the Catholic religion alone should have that large of an effect on the issue and 
have the sole power to overrule the positive effects of the common law system. This is because our 
previous findings in the case of the Muslim countries do not wholly support the arguments of Stulz 
and Williamson, and therefore in our sample there must be other reasons that can be used to explain 
the differences. However, for example Zimbabwe, which is also a Protestant country with both civil 
and common law legal system, does not suggest many of the shareholder right mechanisms either. 
When we look at Kenya, which in theory should have highest investor protection with both Protestant 
and common law background, it does recommend many of the mechanisms which should be present 
for better investor protection. 
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All in all it would seem that findings of La Porta et al. (1998) which suggest that former British 
colonies with common-law background have better property rights and financial markets than other 
colonies, are not as entirely visible in the corporate governance codes of our sample. In our sample it 
would seem that many of the French and Spanish origin countries have recommended many specific 
governance mechanisms that are can be considered as good governance mechanism especially when 
shareholder rights are considered. Therefore, as either Stulz and Williamson (2003) or La Porta et al. 
cannot explain the variation in the investor right recommendations completely, we extend the 
argument of colonial heritage and argue that similarities between the colonizer and colonies’ 
economies would make less developed colonies more likely to adopt their colonizer’s governance 
practices. France and Spain are both considered Latin countries in Weimer and Pape’s (1999) 
taxonomy, where traditionally families and states have been important stakeholders as they are also 
in Africa, thus making the context in many African countries more suitable for following these 
colonizers’ examples. Therefore, as we have acknowledged earlier that at least in some countries and 
aspects the context has been considered in the development of the codes, we assume that the 
developers in, for example, French colonies have considered their context to at least partly be 
comparable to the environment in France. Also, we argue that making clear and direct 
recommendations in developed countries’ codes, rather than vague or open-ended recommendations 
that are visible in OECD Principles and partly in the UK code for example, have an effect on colonies’ 
codes as well. French code clearly states that it is in favour of for example the one-share-one-vote 
practice, putting issues on the agenda, say-on-pay policy and that it is against preferred shares and 
other such mechanisms, and its former colonies recommend many of the same mechanisms as well. 
Therefore, clear recommendation and examples of the colonizer may well be significant enough to 
overrule many of the problems related to religion, and religious or civil law systems in corporate 
governance. We suggest that in the case where there are clear instructions and recommendations on 
issues, such as shareholder right protection in the colonizer’s code, the former colonies have a clearer 
path to follow regardless of their religious or legal origin, and therefore are able to escape or minimise 
the hindrances caused by the country’s religious background for example. 
 
In addition to the suggestions above, we suggest that the mortality rates of the settlers have indeed 
affected the corporate governance code development in Africa as Acemoglu et al. (2001) would 
suggest. Our analysis shows that the majority of former French colonies compared to the British 
colonies have not developed their own code, and as former French colonies in general have higher 
mortality estimates for settlers than British colonies, it can be argued that these differences in 
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mortality rates have affected whether the countries have been able to build necessary institutions for 
development of corporate governance codes. This argument is further supported by the result that the 
former French colonies which do have a code in place have also lower settler mortality rates than 
other French colonies. This can also be seen in the overall mortality rate results, which show that the 
mortality rates are significantly lower in countries which have issued a corporate governance code. 
In addition, for example the Belgian extractive state colonialization strategy (Acemoglu et al.) 
probably has had an effect on the fact that its former colonies have not issued corporate governance 
codes, as their colonialization strategy did not build the foundation for the institutions needed for 
sophisticated governance development. This can also explain the higher corruption levels in these 
countries, as Kimbro (2011) suggests that weak institutional development can lead to higher 
corruption. Therefore, we do emphasise the importance of colonial heritage in the development of 
corporate governance code, but not directly through mirroring colonizer’s code but rather the 
importance of the colonial heritage is more indirect through institutional development and 
colonialization strategy. Also, we argue that especially in the case of Russia and partly also with Italy 
too, the corruption levels and culture of corruption of the colonizer may have affected the economy 
and business practices of the colony in such a way that the overall culture is not as welcoming and 
familiar with corporate governance as it could be with less corrupt country as a colonizer. 
 
Lastly, Rwegasira (2000) suggests that African countries should follow the example of institutionally-
based corporate governance, and Okike (2007) has argued that rather than following the example of 
developed markets, Nigeria should follow the example of South Africa in its corporate governance 
system and code development. As the King II adopted the inclusive model of corporate governance 
as opposed to its colonizer United Kingdom’s shareholder exclusive model, and Nigeria has now 
included wide stakeholder recognition in its code compared to Rossouw’s (2005) study, it can be said 
that Okike’s recommendation has been acknowledged in Nigeria. Although South Africa is still an 
exception in African markets with its developed financial markets (Rossouw), we still support Okike’s 
argument that African countries could follow the example of South Africa especially with wider 
stakeholder inclusion and risk management (for example on corruption and unethical behaviour) 
recommendations. 
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7 Conclusions and further remarks 
 
7.1 Conclusions 
 
The objective of this study has been to address whether corporate governance codes in Africa are 
adequate for African environment, and have the codes been adapted to fit their environment. Although 
the continent is not similar in every aspect, African context can in general be described with high 
amount of informal businesses, concentrated ownership, problems with weak legal institutions and 
high levels of corruption. All these issues have an effect on what kind of corporate governance 
mechanisms can be useful and effective. Therefore, following too closely the recommendations and 
guidelines of country’s former colonizer might not be effective, as their codes are developed to fit 
their own context with more developed financial markets and stronger institutions. 
 
Major finding for this research has been that African countries have rather followed the route of 
Anglo-Saxon corporate governance as opposed to the Germanic governance recommendations, even 
though the countries would have had both Germany and Great Britain as its colonizer. This can be 
especially seen with the unitary board recommendations over the dual board system. However, there 
is variation in the level of how much countries have mirrored especially other colonizers’ codes as 
well, and the major similarities between colonizers with shareholder right recommendations in 
general. Also the performance related remuneration is a major similarity between the colonies and 
colonizers, although it might not be as effective mechanism in Africa as it can be in other markets. It 
seems that the corporate governance framework in Africa in relation to European colonizers is 
twofold: on one other hand African countries seem to be leading Europeans and encourage wider 
stakeholder inclusion, but on the other hand some countries seem to be lagging in especially 
independence guidelines. 
 
Although there are similarities between the colonizers and colonies’ codes, there are still some issues 
that show that the African codes are not merely mimicked from the colonizers’ codes. Issues that 
show that the codes are not directly replicated from former colonizers’ codes are, for example, the 
acknowledgment of corruption as an issue in many countries, the inclusive model of corporate 
governance, and the encouragement of institutional investors to directly influence the company and 
board due to the lack of expertise of the individual domestic shareholders. The European codes on 
the other hand have started to focus more on recommendations relating to compensation policies of 
executives and limiting short-term remuneration. However, as principal-principal problems are more 
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of an issue in Africa than traditional principal-agency problems, due to the prevailing ownership 
structure, the codes recommendations should be even more directed at mitigating these problems than 
they are now.  
 
Also the smallness of African labour market and the small amount of listed companies compared 
against informal businesses and family- and state owned companies has to be acknowledged in 
addressing suitability of the codes to the context. Encouraging only listed companies to adopt the 
recommendations of the codes in such context might not be enough to attract investors, lift the overall 
level of governance and truly embed good governance to the business practices in African context. 
The major issue for Africa is that investors do not trust the legal enforcement of their rights, and 
therefore the problem for investors and creditors is not limited only to listed companies and therefore 
recommending only them to improve their governance might not be enough for investors. 
 
Corruption is still a major issue for many a countries in Africa, which makes the commitment to more 
ethical business behind the scenes harder. Corruption level of the country can be seen in some of the 
codes, as some highly corrupt countries do address problems of corruption more profoundly than 
other countries. In addition, mentions of corruption in the African codes is a sign that countries have 
not just mimicked the codes of their former colonizers but have rather developed guidelines that are 
more in line with their specific context and its problems and issues. This can also be seen in the 
updates of previous codes, as for example Nigeria has taken into account specific problems and 
criticism directed at their previous code and improved their revised code to better fit with their 
context. Also, the colonizers’ mortality rates are lower in those African countries which have issued 
a corporate governance code, implying that the institutional development has been higher in these 
countries, which has resulted in better developed corporate governance as well. Therefore, we 
emphasise the importance of colonial heritage in the development of corporate governance codes in 
Africa. However, our results show that countries have not merely mirrored their colonizers’ codes 
directly, but rather the importance of the colonial heritage is more indirect through institutional 
development and colonialization strategy. 
 
Although the code sample does not include all African colonies or European colonizers, we have 
addressed these countries without a code as well in our study. Also some countries, such as Tanzania, 
have previously been found to have made reports or guidelines that have been qualified as corporate 
governance codes, and therefore, we can draw conclusions that similar interest in developing good 
quality corporate governance in Africa is not limited only to the countries of our sample. Therefore, 
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we can generalise our findings of environmentally and contextually adjusted corporate governance 
principles across a wider range of African countries as well. Thus, we suggest that in future new 
corporate governance codes on the continent will most likely also acknowledge their specific context 
in developing these codes. 
 
7.2 Possible limitations 
 
The main limitation of this study is that the study is merely a comparative take on the subject of 
corporate governance codes in Africa, based on public information available at the moment. Thus, 
this study does not address, if the companies in these countries are actually following the guidelines 
to the point, or have they adopted some of the guidelines in practise and overlooked others. Also, it 
is possible that in reality the principles would not be used at all in some companies. Therefore, 
although it might seem that some countries have better corporate governance code recommendations 
than theory would suggest, for example, due to their religious background, this does not mean that 
companies in said countries would actually follow the recommendations. Also the data may be partly 
limited due to different understandings and definitions of what corporate governance entails and 
consists in each country, and therefore some areas and issues of governance that are present in some 
of the codes are not included in others for different definitions. However, we have tried to minimise 
this problem by examining also national legislation on specific issues, when mentions of such issues 
have not been found in the codes themselves, for the results to be comprehensive and comparable. 
The corporate governance codes have primarily been designed to complement and accompany this 
binding legislation in countries. Therefore, we do acknowledge that the codes, which have been the 
main data for our study, are first and foremost recommendations from which companies can deviate, 
if they so choose. Thus, in practice the quality of governance can still be higher in countries, where 
the codes would not be the most sophisticated according to the theoretical sophistication level of 
recommendations. 
 
7.3 Further research 
 
For further research, we would suggest studying, whether these guidelines described in the various 
codes mentioned are actually being used in the countries in question. Further research should, 
therefore, be made on how much weight these guidelines actually have in practise or are they merely 
a result of public and outside pressure to publish a code to give the image that governance has been 
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improved in the country. Another research opportunity is to study, what kind of measures there are to 
continuously improve the governance codes and guidelines in the countries, which are already making 
these guidelines, and what kind of measures countries, which have not yet issued them, are making 
in the area of developing their own guidelines. 
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